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COMMENT
UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ:
THE SUPREME COURT GUNS DOWN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
When Alfonso Lopez arrived at school on March 12, 1992, he may have
been packing a pistol, but he was not packing a copy of the United States
Constitution.' He carried a concealed weapon, not a concealed copy of the
Federalist Papers, or the famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden.' But Lopez armed
himself with these weapons when he recently carried his case all the way to
the United States Supreme Court.
When federal authorities learned that Lopez entered school grounds with a
.38 caliber pistol, they charged him with violating the Gun-Free School Zone
Act of 1990.3 This federal law, enacted under the Commerce Clause,'
criminalized gun possession in or near a school.5 Lopez challenged the consti-
tutionality of the law in the Texas district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit,6 and the United States Supreme Court. In a shocking deci-
sion,' the Supreme Court struck down the law and held that Congress had
exceeded its commerce power.'
This decision sent shockwaves, since the Court had previously allowed
Congress free reign over interstate commerce. Since the late 1930s, the Court
upheld all congressional decisions to regulate activities in the name of "inter-
state commerce."'" Under the guise of regulating commerce, Congress
1. George F. Will, Commerce Clause Misuse Takes Power from the States, BUFF. NEWS,
Nov. 23, 1994 (Viewpoints), at B3.
2. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. I1 1988); see infra note 218 for the text of the statute.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For text of the Commerce Clause, see infra text accom-
panying note 28.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
6. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993).
7. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
8. One writer for the Washington Post Editorials said of the Lopez decision, "If you thought
Congress has been chopping away at Big Government this year, this week the Supreme Court
landed a punch square on the kisser of federal power." A Commentary, Editorials, THE WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1995, at A14 (Editorial). And as Jeffrey Rosen, a legal affairs writer for the New
Republic, said, "We are ... on the threshold of a constitutional moment." Jeffrey Rosen, Fed Up,
Editorial, Ptrr, POST GAZETTE, May 7, 1995 at El (Editorial).
9. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on an Indian Commerce
Clause case this year (the power to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes). Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995) (granting certiorari on Seminole Indian Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 11
F.3d 1016 (11 th Cir. 1995)). This case offers the Court the opportunity to limit the Indian Com-
merce Clause in the same manner as they attempted to limit the interstate Commerce Clause in
Lopez.
10. E.g., Robert H. Freilich, The Supreme Court and State and Local Government: Small
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legislated on an array of diverse topics-arguably with tenuous relations to
commerce-such as pollution, racial discrimination, labor strife, sales practic-
es, and fraud." Additionally, Congress used its interstate commerce power to
impose hundreds of criminal laws. 2
All of this was possible because the Court used an extremely broad test,
the "substantial affects" test, to review congressional commerce decisions. 3
This test measured how much the activity Congress chose to regulate affected
interstate commerce; if the activity imposed a "substantial" influence on inter-
state commerce, then the Court upheld the regulation as within Congress's
commerce power. This test required only that the Court speculate as to the
effect, and the "substantialness" of that effect to interstate commerce, Con-
gress sought to manage. This test did not require Congress to explain its deci-
sions, the effect Congress perceived, through legislative findings. 4 This test
left the subjective determinations of what activities "substantially affect" inter-
state commerce to Congress, and the courts simply reviewed the rationality of
that determination. Using this test, the Court continually upheld, even expand-
Change for a Changing Court, 26 URB. LAW 623, 629 (1994) (analyzing the Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion and its implications for federal gun laws).
11. For congressional authority to enact environmental laws, see e.g., United States v. River-
side-Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding congressional commerce authority to regu-
late water pollution and the wetlands under the Clean Water Act); see also Dennis J. Priolo, Sec-
tion 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case for Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction over Isolated
Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER REV. 91 (1995) (discussing congressional authority to enact some
environmental laws).
For congressional authority to prohibit racial discrimination, see Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S.
298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
The Court upheld Congress's ability to regulate labor strife in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In United States v.
American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), the Court upheld congressional regu-
lation of sales practices and fraud.
12. See Stephen Chippendale, More Harm Than Good: Assession Federalization of Criminal
Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455 (1994). Chippendale discusses federal criminal law, asserting that the
"unchecked" federalization of criminal laws could be bridled by the courts, the executive branch,
Congress, or through a congressionally appointed commission.
13. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. Regulations under the Commerce Clause trigger the "substan-
tial affects" test. This test measures how much the regulated activity affects, or influences, inter-
state commerce. If the regulated activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the courts
will uphold the regulation of that activity. See infra section III.C. and infra text accompanying
notes 371-415 for an analysis of this test.
This Comment refers to the "substantial affects" test as the "substantial affects" test even in
sentences where the rules of proper grammar would dictate the word "effect." The reason for this
is twofold. First, Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically referred to the proper Commerce Clause
"test" as the "substantial affects" test and this Comment took no liberties to improve or correct the
Chief Justice's grammar. Second, in an earlier era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court
used a different test for review of congressional commerce legislation-the "direct effects" test.
See infra text accompanying notes 101-21. It seemed that the use of the word "effect" in reference
to the "substantial affects" test would further confuse an already nebulous distinction between the
two eras.
14. For a further discussion of the "substantial affects" test, see infra text accompanying
notes 371-415.
The legislative findings requirement, or lack of a requirement, is important. Lopez took a
bold step by insinuating that Congress might protect legislation by including findings. This impli-
cation perhaps changes the judicial review of Commerce Clause legislation. See infra section
III.B. and text accompanying notes 351-70 for a discussion of these implications.
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ed, Congress's commerce power. In Lopez, however, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed with Congress's choice, and for the first time since the 1930s, struck
down legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Analyzing the
Gun-Free School Zone Act, the Court asserted that gun possession in a school
zone does not "substantially affect" interstate commerce. The Court also
noted that Congress failed to include legislative findings articulating the nexus
between interstate commerce and gun possession, a connection invisible to the
Court's unaided eye.' 6
The Lopez decision considerably altered Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence-the extent of congressional power that Congress and the lower courts
understood the Commerce Clause to encompass. First, the case hinders
Congress's previously unfettered freedom to regulate using its commerce pow-
er. Until Lopez, Congress faced no real limit on its Commerce Clause power;
Lopez changed this unlimited power by sending a message to Congress that it
must safeguard future legislation by including explicit findings expressing the
nexus between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. This message is
new to Congress, for the Court previously did not require congressional find-
ings to uphold legislation. 7 In addition, by implying that Congress must in-
clude findings with its legislation, Lopez also altered how the lower courts
approach Commerce Clause cases; the courts will now weigh the merit of
these findings instead of speculating about what Congress can reasonably do,
as was the courts' traditional practice. s This decision also opens the door to
15. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
16. Id. at 1625, 1631-32.
17. Several cases support the notion that the Court does not require findings to uphold legis-
lation. For some examples, see Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2096, 2100 (1993); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 276 (1981) [hereinafter Hodel]; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
18. Several circuits have addressed the Commerce Clause since Lopez. For example, United
States v. Bishop, Nos. 94-5321 and 94-5387, 1995 WL 524791 (3d Cir. Sept. 7, 1995) (upholding
the rationality of a federal carjacking statute); United States v. Pappadopoulos, No. 93-10577,
1995 WL 502907 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1995) (rejecting the federal arson statute because it lacked the
necessary nexus to interstate commerce); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 234, 236-37 (8th Cir.
1995) (discussing a federal carjacking statute in light of Lopez); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d
1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1995) (validating the federal regulation of gun possession by a felon);
United States v. Carolina, 61 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding a federal carjacking statute);
United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 549-50 (9th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing the Gun-Free School
Zone of 1990 from a carjacking statute); United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 454-57 (8th Cir.
1995) (dealing with second category of commerce, "things" in interstate commerce); United States
v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that machine guns connote interstate com-
merce); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing to Lopez in a foot-
note and noting the absence of a jurisdictional element [findings] in section 922(q) of the Gun-
Free School Zone Act).
The notion that Congress legislates and the Supreme Court adjudicates reflects one of the
important principles of our government, separation of powers. The Framers established this system
to prevent the potential for the tyranny they feared under alternative systems. James Madison
wrote, "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison)
(J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Separation of powers ensures that each branch of government performs only the functions
of that branch. This notion plays an especially important role when the Court reviews acts of
1995l
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inconsistent judicial decisions by requiring courts to make the delicate and
subjective determination of whether a challenged regulated activity affects
commerce as much as past valid regulations or as little as gun possession. The
Lopez decision forces courts to assess the validity of legislation according to
their own perceptions of "substantial." By forcing the courts to make these
factual, empirical decisions and by requiring congressional findings, or expla-
nations, the Lopez Court effectively resuscitated an era of judicial
policymaking and arbitrary decisions.
Despite these obstacles that Congress now faces, it may be that Lopez
actually changes little. Lopez really only limits Congress by the facts of
Lopez-all other legislation could still pass constitutional muster. If the Court
wanted to actually halt Congress's commerce power, it should have done so
by altering the expansive "substantial affects" test, not by arbitrarily distin-
guishing the facts of one case. The Court should have qualified the test by its
terms. This would have provided lower courts and Congress the necessary
guidance for the future, deterred judicial policymaking, eliminated confusion,
and still reached the desired end of limiting Congress.
This Comment explains how Lopez considerably changed how Congress
and the courts will react to Commerce Clause issues. Yet the Comment also
asserts that despite the Court's intent to circumscribe congressional action
under the Commerce Clause, Lopez only limits the power in very specific
factual circumstances. Lopez set an arbitrary limit which will only prevent
future legislation that closely mirrors the Gun-Free School Zone Act. The
result is still a nearly unbridled power.
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of the Commerce Clause,
including the Framers' intent and early interpretations of the Commerce
Clause. Part II summarizes the Lopez decision-the majority opinion, concur-
rences, and dissents. Part III then analyzes the implications of the decision. It
explains how the decision opened the door to judicial policymaking, overruling
a history of deference to Congress, and explains the significance of congres-
sional findings for future legislation. Part III further discusses the "substantial
affects" test, asserting that this test remains absurdly broad and effectively
imposes no limits on congressional action. Part III concludes by suggesting
how the Court could place tangible limits on Congress by adding a new prong
to the existing "substantial affects" test. Under this proposed version of the
substantial affects test, courts would first examine whether the activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce, and then whether the federal regulation
of that activity is appropriate. This second prong would ensure that Congress
does not trample state authority, by forcing Congress to enact only those laws
Congress. In reviewing and perhaps striking legislation, the Court might slip across the line of
"adjudication" and into the legislative branch's territory of "legislating" by second guessing the
judgment of Congress and replacing that judgment for the Court's judgment. This Comment does
not directly address the doctrine of separation of powers. While the Comment asserts that one of
the implications of United States v. Lopez is that courts might overstep their roles as adjudicators
and begin legislating, see infra text accompanying notes 351-70, it does not directly discuss this
as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
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necessary to promote the vitality and growth of our nation's interstate com-
merce.
I. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause suffers from a somewhat tortured history. General-
ly, the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate "interstate com-
merce." 9 The United States Supreme Court first understood this to mean the
power over interstate commerce, 20 and the Court used "definitions" to inter-
pret the scope of the power. However, time soon revealed to the Court that
interpreting the Commerce Clause using definitions produced inconsistent
precedent. 2' This realization led the Court to apply several different
tests-creating test upon test-as the Court attempted to properly define the
reach of the Commerce Clause.22 With the creation of the "substantial af-
fects" test,21 it seemed the "tortured" history of the Commerce Clause came
to rest. For over fifty years, the Court used the same test, upheld all of
Congress's commercial regulations, and Congress saw nearly unbounded pow-
er.24 In United States v. Lopez, the Court again "tortured" Congress and the
Commerce Clause by striking a federal regulation enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause.
A. The Constitution and the Framers' Intent
Through the Constitution, our nation's Framers created a government of
enumerated powers.2" Congress may only act in accordance with its enumer-
ated powers.26 The powers the Constitution did not enumerate, the states
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73 for a discussion of the semantics era, in which
the Court used the "definition" of the regulated activity-whether or not this was "commerce"-to
determine if Congress had the power over that activity.
21. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see infra text accompanying
notes 259-64.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 35-52 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's at-
tempts to interpret the Commerce Clause. The Court went from defining commerce as a stream,
see infra text accompanying notes 75-85, to using a "direct/indirect effects test," see infra text
accompanying notes 101-21, and then finally creating the "substantial affects" test, see infra text
accompanying notes 122-212.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 101-38.
24. Lopez was the first time since the creation of the "substantial affects" test, in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1941), that the Supreme Court struck down a congres-
sional regulation under the Commerce Clause.
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824).
26. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. Chief Justice Marshall explained:
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal com-
merce of a State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within
a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to
interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.
The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for
the State itself.
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
reserved.2 7 Among these enumerated powers, the Constitution granted Con-
gress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."28 Foreseeing commerce as a pos-
sible source of dissension, the Framers granted Congress this commerce power
to preserve the unified nation.29 The Framers feared that the states, as the
sole regulators of commerce, would serve self-interested goals, seek to profit
from other states' profits, and discriminate against other states at will.3"
These acts would breed discontent, and lead to "outrages" and "reprisals."'
'3
To secure the people against these dangers, the Framers designed a nation with
unified commercial purposes centered in one government.32 A consolidated
commercial power would also protect the nation from foreign nations' jeal-
ousies and rivalries.
33
Neither the language of the Commerce Clause nor the Framers' intent
behind the Commerce Clause grants Congress power over all commerce. Con-
gress only has power over interstate commerce, that is, the portions of com-
merce necessary to bind and protect the nation. For example, the Commerce
Clause allows Congress to prevent Colorado from usurping Alaskan oil profits,
Virginia's tobacco gain, and Pennsylvania's steel revenue. It ensures that Cali-
fornia trades fairly and evenly with all states, not discriminating between states
of its choosing. But the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to reach
all the internal activities of the states, only those activities necessary to pro-
mote the nation's unity and prosperity. 34 These goals and interests of the
27. Id. The Tenth Amendment also ensures the states retained powers not enumerated by the
Constitution. The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
30. Id. It seems the Framers feared that one state might enact laws counter to the interests of
another state in order to persuade the other state to "share" the benefits and profits of its resourc-
es. Under this reasoning, the interstate Commerce Clause would prevent Kansas from taking mea-
sures against Colorado, perhaps an embargo placed only on Colorado's buffalo meat, unless Colo-
rado forced its tourists to stop at the "Largest Prairie Dog" exit in Kansas. Kansas, according to
the Framers' reasoning, would be placing an extra burden on Colorado unless it shared the profits
of its resources-tourism. This embargo would be counter to a unified commercial nation, and
thus counter to the Framers' goals. See infra note 34.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-40.
32. Id. at 40; THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 308 (James Madison).
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton stated:
The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The
States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantag-
es of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors.
Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy pecu-
liar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would
beget discontent.
Id. Unreasonable and inequitable laws of the young states revealed the verity of the Framers'
fears. See id. at 38-39 (discussing particular inequitable measures between some of the early
states). As Justice Johnson later reflected:
For a century the States had submitted, with murmurs, to the commercial restrictions
imposed by the parent State; and now, finding themselves in the unlimited possession of
those powers over their own commerce, which they had so long been deprived of, and
so earnestly coveted, that selfish principle which, well controlled, is so salutary, and
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Framers, in creating the commerce power, set the guidelines for the Supreme
Court in interpreting the scope and extent of the Commerce Clause.
B. .. And Then There Was Gibbons
Gibbons v. Ogden35 was a watershed in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Marshall outlined the scope of Congress's commerce power,
defining the Commerce Clause and its limits. First, Marshall addressed how to
interpret the Commerce Clause. He interpreted the Commerce Clause in terms
of the language and purpose of the Constitution. The Constitution, he wrote,
represents the change the nation underwent as the states surrendered powers to
the federal government.36 It established the extent of those changes by grant-
ing Congress only certain enumerated powers.37 In other words, the Constitu-
tion embodies the extent of the powers the states ceded to the federal gov-
ernment when forming the Republic. The powers not enumerated in the Con-
stitution, therefore, the states reserved.
Marshall instructed the courts, however, to ensure that laws furthered the
purposes of the Framers in designing the Constitution. He also warned courts
against unnecessarily constricting the language of the Constitution. He saw
no part of the Constitution as mandating narrow construction.39 Instead, Mar-
shall asserted that while courts should not exaggerate the meaning of the
words of the Constitution, courts should not unnecessarily limit them." Addi-
tionally, Marshall assumed that people use words that best express their mean-
which, unrestricted, is so unjust and tyrannical, guided by inexperience and jealousy,
began to show itself in impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict of commer-
cial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their commercial
interests abroad.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Gibbons, see infra section lI.B.; see text accompanying notes 35-61.
35. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Gibbons applied the commerce power to navigation; the
federal government could regulate navigation because all of the nation understood "commerce" to
include navigation. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 193.
36. Id. at 187.
37. Id. at 187, 195. Marshall stated, "No direct general power over these objects [inspection
laws] is granted to Congress, and consequently, they remain subject to State legislation. If the
legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it must be where
the power is expressly given ..... Id. at 203-04.
38. Id. at 187-88 (arguing against construing the Constitution narrowly). Chief Justice Mar-
shall urged that so long as the courts do not enlarge the meaning of the words, there is no need to
read them too narrowly. Id.
39. Id. Marshall admitted that some had argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause of the
Constitution called for a narrow construction of the Constitution. Marshall countered this argu-
ment:
[Tlhis limitation [the Necessary and Proper Clause] on the means which may be used, is
not to be extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the
Constitution, which has been pointed out to the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have
been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves jus-
tified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they contend
only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond their natural
and obvious import, we might question the application of the term.
40. Id.
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ing." He concluded that the Framers explicitly granted-and therefore intend-
ed to grant--Congress the power over commerce among the states. The Fram-
ers used the words, "Congress shall have the power ... over interstate com-
merce."42 Marshall reasoned, then, that this grant of power means that Con-
gress shall have the power over interstate commerce, since the Framers used
the words that best expressed their meaning. 3
Marshall embraced an enormous task in Gibbons. Not only did he explain
how to interpret the Constitution, but he defined "commerce." Commerce is a
unit, he wrote, and the term indicates its parts." Commerce is at least traf-
fic," yet it encompasses more than just traffic. It is commercial inter-
course.' It is that commercial intercourse occurring between nations, parts of
nations, and branches of nations. It is navigation." It is cargo and it is pas-
sengers on carriers." The power to regulate commerce bestows the further
power to create rules and enact laws governing commerce." This power is
plenary,5' complete in itself and qualified only by the Constitution. 2
Yet this power, as plenary and extensive as it is, has limits. The Constitu-
tion states, "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce ... among
the several States."5 Thus, the Constitution limits the reach of the Commerce
Clause through the word "among." Marshall also defined "among" as used in
the Commerce Clause. "Among" means intermingled with.54 It does not in-
clude commerce that affects only one state and the people within that state.55
The word does not, however, mandate that federal regulations stop at the
border of each state.56 "Among" allows federal, commercial regulations over
activities-even if they occur intrastate-that concern more than one state. 7
Marshall reminded Congress that the states remain the most important part
of the Republic.58 The states may do that which the federal government may
not.59 State regulations may resemble an interstate commercial regulation, or
may either tenuously or considerably affect interstate commerce.' In contrast,
41. Id. at 188.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
43. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 188.
44. Id. at 194.
45. Id. at 189.
46. Id. at 189-90.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 193.
49. Id. at 215.
50. See id. at 190.
51. Id. at 197.
52. Id. at 196.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Gibbons 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95.
54. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
55. Id.
56. Id. Marshall explained, "[l]n regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of
Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless
power, if it could not pass those lines." Id. at 195.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 199.
59. See id. (discussing the power of the states to tax for purposes that the federal govern-
ment cannot).
60. Id. at 203-04. In this portion of Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the
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federal law may control state law only so far as necessary to effectively ex-
ercise an enumerated power, and it may not otherwise deny the states' authori-
ty to govern in the same area.6' Since the federal commerce power is plenary,
however, this interrelationship between state and federal power poses only a
small obstacle to federal commerce power.
C. After Gibbons
In the first one hundred years or so after Gibbons, the Supreme Court
primarily examined the Commerce Clause as it related to the scope of state
authority. The Court reviewed cases challenging the extent of the states' com-
merce power in light of a federal commerce power. The states had ceded
interstate commerce power to Congress; yet the question remained whether the
states also reserved a commercial power, and if so, to what extent the states
could exercise this power. Using the language of the Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court upheld Maine's ability to regulate navigation on a river within
her borders.62 The Court also allowed a state to prohibit the manufacture and
production of intoxicating liquors when the manufacturing occurred within the
state.6" By defining the reach of state power, these cases expressed the scope
of federal power.64 If courts allowed states to regulate an activity, then the
activity was intrastate, by virtue of federal power over interstate activity. This
indirectly established the reach of the Commerce Clause. The federal govern-
ment had the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the states reserved
the power to regulate intrastate activities.
federal control over interstate commerce was not exclusive-the states may still act. The states
lacked the power only insofar as they attempted to achieve the same commercial ends. Id. In
Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829), Delaware enacted a law al-
lowing a dam to be constructed on a stream, even though the stream was deep enough to be used
by boats moving in interstate commerce. Chief Justice Marshall upheld the state regulation. Al-
though the state statute reflected a commercial regulation, it also affected the value of property
and the health of Delaware citizens. These measures were valid so long as they did not collide
with the accomplishment of a federal goal. Id. at 249-50.
61. Black Bird, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 241-42. According to the doctrine of preemption, when
federal and state laws collide, the federal regulation wins the contest. Chief Justice Marshall rec-
ognized the doctrine of preemption, but he also knew that until the laws collided-that is, the state
law made impossible or impractical the accomplishment of a federal goal-the Constitution autho-
rized both governments to act. Id. at 210. This Comment does not address the delicate relationship
between federal and state law, albeit an issue that Lopez could have altered. For a very brief dis-
cussion of the state and federal governments' interplay, see infra note 195. For a discussion of
how Lopez affected the relationship between the federal and state governments, see Daniel A.
Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the
Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615 (1995).
62. Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568 (1852).
63. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
64. The Kidd Court, for example, upheld a state prohibition of liquor production within its
borders. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 26. This decision may have implied that the federal government lacked
the power to regulate this area. The Lopez Court discussed this principle of the early cases. See
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1635 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1995]
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1. Semantics and Nomenclature
While the first one hundred years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
centered on the scope of state authority, industrialization began a new era for
the Commerce Clause. Industrialization led to many federal economic regula-
tions65 and a period of Commerce Clause jurisprudence which turned on defi-
nition, semantics, and nomenclature.' United States v. E.C. Knight Co.
6 7
launched this definitional period. The Knight Court held that the federal
Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibited industrial monopolies, did not apply
to American Sugar Refining Co., which had arguably gained a monopoly over
sugar-refining.' American Sugar might have "combined and conspired to
restrain trade"-a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Yet if the activity
was not interstate commerce, then the federal law could not apply to it-the
activity would be outside the purview of the federal government's reach or the
reach of the Commerce Clause. The Knight Court, using a "semantics ap-
proach," '9 questioned whether the regulated activity, sugar refining, met the
Court's definition of commerce. After defining sugar refining as
"manufacturing," the Court readily and easily distinguished manufacturing
from commerce.7" Manufacturing seemed to be a purely local enterprise.7
Allowing Congress the power over manufacturing would give Congress the
power over agriculture, mining, and other traditionally local activities. The
Knight Court feared this result," and refused to transfer state power into the
federal government's hands in this way."
65. E.g., The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1995)); The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 5, 24 Stat.
379 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (1995)).
66. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1635 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This era
did not overrule Gibbons, but rather, seemingly tried to apply Gibbons to those activities involv-
ing commerce. The Court sought to find which activities involved commerce by "defining" com-
merce and determining if that definition encompassed the regulated activity.
67. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
68. Knight, 156 U.S. at 18. American Sugar Refining Co., by purchasing stock in four Phila-
delphia sugar refineries, acquired nearly complete control over the manufacture of refined sugar.
Id. at 9. Plaintiffs in Knight complained that by so doing, American Sugar "combined and con-
spired to restrain the trade and commerce in refined sugar," a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1995)). Id.
69. See text accompanying supra note 66 (discussing the "semantic approach").
70. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12-14.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 16. The Kidd v. Pearson Court, which upheld a state prohibition of liquor produc-
tion, also wanted to protect state autonomy:
[H]ow can it further that object so to interpret the constitutional provision as to place
upon congress [sic] the obligation to exercise the supervisory powers just indicated? The
demands of such supervision would require, not uniform legislation generally applicable
throughout the United States, but a swarm of statutes only locally applicable, and utterly
inconsistent. Any movement towards the establishment of rules of production in this vast
country, with its many different climates and opportunities, could only be at the sacrifice
of their peculiar advantages of a large part of the localities in it, if not every one of
them.... A situation more paralyzing to the state governments, and more provocative
of the conflicts between the general government and the states, and less likely to have
been what the framers of the constitution intended, it would be difficult to imagine.
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1888).
73. Knight, 156 U.S. at 16. The Court held that manufacturing is production and production
is not commerce. Id. at 20. Other cases also used the semantic approach to define the scope of
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2. Commingling and the Instrumentalities of Commerce
Cases challenging Congress's commerce power continued to reach the
Supreme Court, and the Court repeatedly attempted to define the scope of
congressional power. While some cases relied on semantics and definitions,"
other cases analogized commerce to a "water current."75 For example, in
Swift & Co. v. United States,76 the Court envisioned commerce as a current,
and held that Congress could regulate items moving in that flow." Under this
reasoning, parts within the flow were inseparable from the flow to which those
parts contributed.78 Thus, the Swift Court upheld application of the Sherman
Antitrust Act to the stockyards of meat dealers.79 The meat dealers in Swift
were charged with conspiring to fix the price of meat." The Court decided
that the cattle at the stockyards contributed to the movement of com-
merce-the cattle became inseparable from the "flow of commerce" to which
the cattle contributed.8' The cattle, moving through this flow of commerce,
became "commerce." Later, in Stafford v. Wallace, 2 the Court used a similar
analysis, again comparing "commerce" to a stream. Items in the "throat of
commerce" were inseparable from the rest of the flow of commerce to which
they contributed." Stockyards, 4 in Stafford, were the "throat" of commerce,
the first step of a continuing process.85 Congress could regulate the throat as
well as the river of commerce.
legislative power. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (discussing how manufacturing is not
commerce); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568 (1852) (explaining that a regulation that applied only
intrastate was not interstate commerce). Even Gibbons noted that the interstate commerce power
included navigation because all the nation understood that "commerce" included "navigation."
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824). This reasoning resonated throughout the
"semantics approach" era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
75. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (holding that cattle moving
in and out of different transactions created a "current" of commerce).
76. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
77. Swift, 196 U.S. at 398-99.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 398..
80. Id. at 395.
81. The Swift Court stated:
[Clommerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practicalone,
drawn from the course of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one
state, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and
when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the
stock yards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus
existing is a current of commerce.
Id. at 398-99.
82. 258 U.S. 495 (1922). The Court observed that cattle stockyards, the place where meat
dealers hold cattle awaiting sale or shipment in interstate commerce, resembled the "throat"
through which commerce flows; the Court held that transactions at the "throat" are inseparable
from the "flow" to which they contributed. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 516.
83. Id. In Stafford, the Court upheld the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, an act autho-
rizing the Secretary of Commerce to regulate the rates and set standards of the operation of stock-
yards. Congress passed the Act in order to prevent the meat dealers from fixing the prices of meat
at outrageous prices.
84. The stockyards held the cattle that waited for sale and shipment in interstate commerce.
85. See id.
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During this same period, the Court knew that some intrastate activities
were so commingled with interstate commerce that they effectively eluded an
interstate-intrastate distinction. 6 The Railroad Rates Cases7 exemplify this
recognition. These cases reviewed Congress's ability to set-or delegate the
power to the Interstate Commerce Commission to set-the maximum rates the
railyards or states could place on items moving along their lines. When the
federal government sought to standardize the rates, the states challenged Con-
gress; the states argued that the interstate commerce power did not permit
regulation of intrastate rates. The Court, however, reasoned otherwise. Mer-
chants often shipped intrastate items on the same carriers as products that
moved interstate.s8 The Court would have liked to distinguish, for Commerce
Clause purposes, between intrastate items and interstate items, thereby estab-
lishing which items and railroad rates the federal government had the power to
regulate and which items and railroad rates the state government had the pow-
er to regulate. Yet forcing a distinction between items leaving the state and
those remaining within the borders imposed an impractical, if not impossible,
burden on the railroads, its employees, and shippers. Intrastate rates commin-
gled with interstate rates to an imperceptible degree.89 Thus, the Court al-
lowed federal regulation of the railroads. 9 The Railroad Rates Cases pre-
sented little difficultly for the Court, which could easily envision the intimate
connection between railroads and interstate commerce. The free flow of com-
merce, as the Framers' designed,9' clearly depended on the railroads,9" and
equitable rates ensured that the railroads ran freely and that commerce among
the states remained unobstructed.
The Railroad Rates Cases represented regulation of an instrumentality of
commerce.93 An instrumentality, it seems, is an "arm" of commerce-it is a
86. This distinction is derived from the very language of the Commerce Clause. The Clause
allows regulation over interstate commerce, thereby excepting intrastate commerce.
87. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 312 (1914) (allowing
federal regulation of intrastate rates insofar as they affected interstate rates) [hereinafter Shreveport
Rates Case]; Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913) (holding that the Interstate Commerce
Commission could regulate intrastate rates so far as they affect interstate rates) [hereinafter Minne-
sota Rates Case].
88. See Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. 312 (1914); Minnesota Rates Case, 230 U.S. 352
(1913).
89. See Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. at 351-52; Minnesota Rates Case, 230 U.S. at 432-
33.
90. Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. at 360; Minnesota Rates Case, 230 U.S. at 432-33.
91. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
92. These cases also represented an instance where the connection of an activity to com-
merce embodied the Framers' vision of the Commerce Clause. See supra notes 25-34 and accom-
panying text. The railroads were a primary means of moving goods across state lines. An obstruc-
tion of the railroads, via discriminatory railroad rates for example, obstructed the movement of
interstate commerce. Congress, therefore, needed to regulate the railroad rates in order to protect
the free flow of commerce.
93. It is unclear why the Court commonly refers to a channel of commerce as distinct from
an instrumentality of commerce; the difference between a channel and instrumentality seems dubi-
ous. See WILLIAM C. BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 289 (Stephen C. DeCosta et al. eds., 2d ed.
1980) (giving the word "channel" as a synonym for the word "instrument"). It seems that a
channel of commerce is a conduit for commerce-the forum for the movement of items across
state lines-and the Court allows federal regulation over items in that conduit or the conduit itself.
While an instrumentality of commerce may be a conduit for commerce, it seems to encompass
(Vol. 73:1
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branch, agent, or contributing force to commerce. Soon after the Railroad
Rates Cases, the Supreme Court reviewed legislation regulating the channels
of commerce, and the Court allowed Congress to keep the- channels free from
noxious articles. The Court upheld Congress's power to prevent citizens from
using the commercial channels as a means to move the evils of intoxicating
liquors, debauchery of women, white slave traffic, impure foods and drugs,
and lottery tickets.94 Those moving the liquor, women, white slaves, impure
foods or drugs, or lottery tickets relied on the channels of commerce to ac-
complish the harmful acts. The Court, therefore, allowed Congress to police
the channels.
By 1918, Congress's power to regulate under the Commerce Clause con-
sisted of the power to regulate commerce and the instrumentalities of com-
merce, 95 as well as the power to regulate the use of the channels of com-
merce for immoral purposes.96 The Court, however, refused to defer com-
pletely to legislative choices. For example, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,97 the
Court invalidated federal regulation of child labor. The government sought to
diminish the hours worked by children of certain ages through a prohibition of
the transportation of "child-labor products" in interstate commerce. 98 Seem-
ingly using the "semantics approach," the Supreme Court invalidated the
federal regulation. The Court did not perceive "commerce" to include "la-
bor"-child or otherwise. "Labor" contributed to, but was not a part of, inter-
state commerce. Thus, child labor fell outside the purview of congressional power. ""
more. An instrumentality appears to be an appendage of commerce, an arm or tool of commerce
necessary to enable the movement of commerce. The railroads are an example of an instrumental-
ity; a railroad itself is not "commerce," but is necessary to aid the movement of commerce. A
railroad is so closely tied to commerce that Congress must regulate the railroad in order to effec-
tively regulate items moving in interstate commerce. The Lopez Court used the railroads as an
example of an "instrumentality" of commerce and the Darby and the later civil rights cases, supra
notes 139-52, 164-75 and accompanying text, as an example of Congress's ability to prevent the
improper or immoral use of the "channels" of commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 U.S. 1624,
1629 (1995).
94. See Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R.R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding
the prohibition on production of liquor); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (allow-
ing congressional regulation of transporting women for debauchery); Hoke v. United States, 227
U.S. 308 (1913) (validating congressional regulation of white slave traffic); Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (validating the Pure Food and Drug Act); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903) (allowing the prohibition of transportation of lottery tickets because they
perpetuate evil).
95. See supra notes 75-93.
96. See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text. Since during this time, the Court allowed
Congress to regulate both the channels of interstate commerce and the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, then it is curious why the Supreme Court bothered to make a distinction between
a "channel" of commerce and an "instrumentality" of commerce. Both appear to be nearly the
same thing, and Congress had authority over both, so it is unclear why the Court decided to mud-
dy some already murky waters with this vague distinction. See supra note 92 for a discussion on
the possible difference between a "channel" of commerce and an "instrumentality" of commerce.
97. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
98. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268-69.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 65-73 for a discussion of the semantics approach.
100. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271. The Hammer Court stated:
In each of these instances [of congressional regulation of the channels of inter-
state commerce] the use of interstate transportation was necessary to the accomplishment
of harmful results. In other words, although the power over interstate transportation was
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3. The Direct/Indirect Effects Test
When the Court decided Schechter Poultry v. United States... and Cart-
er v. Carter Coal Co.,"2 it realized that a Commerce Clause analysis based
on semantics had produced factually inconsistent precedent. In an attempt to
stabilize Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court devised the "di-
rect/indirect effects" test. Under this test, the Court looked not to the source of
the injury, but to the effect of the regulated activity on commerce." 3 The
Court ignored the "definition" of the regulated activity and focused on the
ultimate impact that activity placed on interstate commerce." 4 If the activity
only had a remote impact on interstate commerce, the Court would strike the
federal regulation.' For example, in the mid-1930s, Congress standardized
poultry-slaughtering conditions through the Live Poultry Code. " ' The Code
included minimum wage and maximum hour requirements; the defendants in
Schechter violated these provisions."7 While these violations may have
clearly affected slaughtering conditions, the Court found that the wage and
hour provisions-or violations of the wage and hour provisions-imposed only
to regulate, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the facilities of
interstate commerce to effect the evil intended.
This element is wanting in the present case. The thing intended to be accom-
plished by this statute is the denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those man-
ufacturers in the states who employ children within the prohibited ages. The act in its
effect does not regulate transportation among the states, but aims to standardize the ages
at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the states. The
goods shipped are themselves harmless .... When offered for shipment, and before
transportation begins, the labor of their production is over, and the mere fact that they
were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their production
subject to federal control under the commerce power.
Id. at 271-72.
101. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
102. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
103. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 544. Prior to this test, the Court looked to see if the regulated
activity fit the definition of commerce, for example, whether "child labor" met the Court's con-
ception of "commerce." Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272. Under this new direct/indirect effects test, the
Court examined whether the source of the injury imposed a direct effect on interstate commerce or
only a remote relation to interstate commerce. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 545-50. If the regulated
activity only remotely related to interstate commerce, remained distant from interstate commerce,
then the Court would strike federal regulations of that activity. But if the activity directly affected
commerce, contributed an immediate or instant effect on commerce, then the Court would uphold
Congress's regulation of that activity. See id.
104. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 545-50.
105. Id.
106. The Live Poultry Code was promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act. Act
of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933). The National Industry Re-
covery Act empowered the President to approve "codes of fair competition" if it would promote
industrial growth, not interfere or compromise other small businesses, and not allow a group to
monopolize a certain industry. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 522-23. The Live Poultry Code was one of
these "codes of fair competition," approved by the President on April 13, 1934. Id. at 523. The
Code included provisions on minimum wages and maximum hours, other general labor provisions,
administration, and trade practice provisions. Id.
107. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 527-28. The defendants were convicted in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York on eighteen counts of violations of the Live Poul-
try Code and one count of conspiring to restrain trade. The defendants appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, arguing that Congress unlawfully delegated its legislative power to the President
and that Congress regulated intrastate commerce, which lay outside its commerce power. Id. at
519.
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a remote and indirect effect on interstate commerce."" Once the chickens
reached the slaughterhouse, commerce ceased, and production, a local activity,
began."' Since, under the direct/indirect effects test, the Commerce Clause
enabled Congress to regulate only those activities which placed a direct effect
on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that Congress could not regulate
the slaughterhouse conditions.
The direct/indirect effect test in Schechter implicitly incorporated all of
the Court's prior Commerce Clause tests. The Court's analysis first distin-
guished between labor and commerce,'" a significant distinction in the se-
mantics era.' The Court also noted that slaughtering remained separate
from interstate commerce, resembling the analysis used by the Court in the
Railroad Rates Cases."2 Finally, mirroring the "flow of commerce" analysis
which emerged during the Swift era, the Court noted that once the Schechters
began slaughtering the chickens, the flow of commerce ceased." 3 Because
the Live Poultry Code failed all these tests, the Court found that the
Schechters' violations of the Code were too remote from interstate commerce
to be subject to federal regulation.'"
Carter v. Carter Coal Co."5 followed one year later, embracing the di-
rect/indirect effects test enunciated in Schechter. The plaintiffs in Carter chal-
lenged a federal regulation of coal prices, mining, and labor,"' forcing the
108. Id. at 543.
109. Id. at 542-43. In other words, the Schechter's slaughtering did not so commingle with
interstate commerce to make a distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce impractical.
The slaughtered chickens remained in the state. The flow of interstate commerce ceased. Id.
110. See id. at 543. The case did not turn on the semantics distinction; however, this distinc-
tion could have been one of the factors that prompted the Court to conclude that the slaughter-
house was indirectly related to interstate commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 65-73 for
a discussion of semantics.
111. The Court recognized that "labor" is not a commercial transaction or an action intended
to obstruct a commercial transaction. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 545-46. This led the Court to con-
clude that the Schechter's violations of the Poultry Code had only an indirect effect on commerce.
112. Id. at 542-43. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93 for a discussion of the Railroad
Rates Cases. In these cases, the Court decided that intrastate rates so commingled with interstate
rates that the Court found it impractical to force a distinction between the intrastate and interstate
rates.
113. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 543. The Swift era is represented by two cases, Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), and Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922). These cases
analogized commerce to a "flow" or a "digestive tract," and the parts within the flow, or tract,
were inseparable from commerce and therefore Congress could regulate them. See supra notes 76-
85 and accompanying text for a discussion of this era and these cases.
114. The Court did not explicitly state that the direct/indirect test was a "summation" of all
prior tests. This is a conclusion that this Comment draws because of the language of the case. It
seems that the direct/indirect effects test incorporated all the prior tests the Court used. Once find-
ing that poultry slaughtering was not part of the Court's conception of "commerce," and it was not
"so commingled" with commerce that it was indistinct from commerce, and that it was not part of
the "flow of commerce," the Court then concluded that it only indirectly affected interstate com-
merce.
115. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). The Carter Court upheld the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 801-802 (1935), an act attempting to stabilize the coal mining industry and
conserve natural resources. Carter, 298 U.S. at 278-79.
116. Carter, 298 U.S. at 278-80. Stockholders of the Carter Coal Company sued the corpora-
tion to prevent the corporation from complying with the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act of 1935. The stockholders feared that compliance would result in a decrease in
profits for the corporation, as the Act required a tax levy on the coal, conservation, and other
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Court to consider whether Congress exceeded its commerce power by regulat-
ing mining.'" 7 The Carter Court, using the direct/indirect effects test, focused
on, and further defined, the meaning of "direct." A direct effect, according to
the Court, meant a proximate effect, not "remote" or "collateral. ' " Direct
effects lacked intervening agents.' 9 "Direct" did not measure magnitude, but
rather the manner in which an act brought about a result. 2 ' The Court, there-
fore, invalidated federal regulation of mining because mining, and especially
labor conditions for miners, only indirectly impacted commerce. 2' The
Court, like the Court in Schechter, could separate "labor" from "commerce." It
seems the Court decided that mining, unlike other acts of "commerce," was
production and only related to commerce through the later acts, or intervening
agents, that brought the mined coal into the flow of commerce.
4. The Downfall of the Direct/Indirect Effects Test and the Birth of
Expanded Congressional Power
a. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'22
The direct/indirect effects test lived a short life. The Court rejected the di-
rect/indirect effects test shortly after its adoption.'23 After Congress enacted
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 4 the Supreme Court decided
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., ushering in a new era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Jones & Laughlin marked an initial murmur which
would eventually set off an avalanche of federal commerce power.
In Jones & Laughlin, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found
that the defendants violated the NLRA by engaging in unlawful labor practic-
es. "'25 The defendants discriminated against members of the union with regard
to hire and tenure, and coerced and intimidated its employees in order to inter-
fere with their self-organization-all actions in violation of the NLRA.'26
The defendants challenged the validity of the NLRA, arguing that Congress
lacked the power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to regulate the labor
conditions in the steel industry. The Jones & Laughlin Court repudiated the
direct/indirect effects test, finding that the test created idle distinctions that
failed to measure remote, yet catastrophic effects. 2 7 According to the Jones
provisions affecting the net profits of Carter Coal. Id.
117. Id. at 297.
118. Id. at 307.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 308.
121. See id. at 304.
122. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
123. Only two years passed between the adoption of the direct/indirect effects test in
Schechter, decided in 1935, and its rejection in Jones & Laughlin, decided in 1937.
124. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1935).
125. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 22.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 41. The Court stated:
[lI]t is idle to say that the effect [of a work stoppage in the steel industry] would be
indirect or remote. It is obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic.
We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life and to deal with
the question of direct and indirect effects in an intellectual vacuum. Because there may
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& Laughlin Court, strife among workers within a steel plant threatened work
stoppages and therefore output from the plant.' 8 It seems the Court feared
that work stoppages, in turn, threatened the amount of steel produced. Dimin-
ished production threatened more than the particular plant suffering from labor
strife; it affected the entire nation's supply of a vital resource. This would be
an indirect, but catastrophic effect on commerce. The Court upheld federal
regulation of steel-production and labor within the steel plants.' 9 In uphold-
ing the regulation, the Jones & Laughlin Court enunciated a new framework
for Commerce Clause analysis. The Court essentially divided the existing
Commerce Clause power into two subsets-or prongs-and then added a third
subset of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The first of these
subsets confirmed Congress's authority over commerce and its instrumentali-
ties. "' This prong verified, for instance, Congress's power to regulate rail-
road rates, a power validated nearly twenty years before in the Railroad Rates
Cases.3' Jones & Laughlin did not create this federal power, then, but mere-
ly confirmed the power already acknowledged by the Court. The Jones &
Laughlin Court also affirmed Congress's ability to regulate the "flow" or
"stream" of commerce.32 This second subset validated precedent permitting
Congress to regulate the "channels" of commerce. 3' Jones & Laughlin then
created a new subset of congressional commerce power. The third prong al-
lowed Congress to regulate activities that "substantially affect" interstate com-
merce. 3 ' This included conduct leading or tending to lead to an obstruction
of commerce. This new subset was one of inclusion and exclusion: the Com-
merce Clause reached all, but also only, those activities that affect interstate
commerce.' This third prong also enabled Congress to regulate constant
practices that burden or threaten the free flow of commerce.'36 The Jones &
Laughlin Court reminded the lower courts, and themselves, that the Constitu-
tion empowers Congress, and not the judiciary, to decide what activities
be but indirect and remote effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of
local enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other industrial activities
do not have such a close and intimate relation to interstate commerce as to make the
presence of industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern.
Id.
128. Id. at 41-42. The Court noted that when an industry, such as the steel industry, "orga-
nize[d] itself on a national scale," id., the industry "ma[de] its relation to interstate commerce the
dominant factor" in its activities. Id. Therefore, that industry's labor relations would be subject to
federal oversight. Id.
129. Id. at 43.
130. id. at 38.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93 (discussing the Railroad Rates Cases).
132. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 34-36. The Jones & Laughlin Court con-




136. Id. at 37. Constant practices, while never explicitly defined by the Jones & Laughlin
Court, seems to mean any activity occurring on a consistent basis. This prong opened the door to
later, expansive reading of the Clause. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see infra text
accompanying notes 153-63.
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burden commerce and how to remove those burdens.' Jones & Laughlin
thus emphasized that courts adjudicate and Congress legislates.3
b. The "Substantial Affects" Test After Jones & Laughlin
The Jones & Laughlin decision and the "substantial affects" test opened
the floodgates for legislative power. The subtlety of individual cases using the
test, however, belied the dramatic growth of the Commerce Clause. It was like
hammering a nail into a wall. With each strike, the hole in the wall grew,
although almost imperceptibly. When removing the nail, the hole appeared
much larger than when the hammering began. The "substantial affects" test,
like the nail in the wall, provided the means for the expansion of congressio-
nal commerce power. Each Commerce Clause case decided after Jones &
Laughlin only slightly expanded the Commerce Clause and legislative power.
And in retrospect, viewing the scope of congressional commerce power nearly
thirty years after Jones & Laughlin, the power seems much larger than when
the "hammering" began.
United States v. Darby"39 is only one example of the Court's broad in-
terpretation of Jones & Laughlin and the "substantial affects" test. The defen-
dants in Darby ran a lumber mill; they were charged with violating wage and
hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.' The mill owners
challenged the Act's validity under the Commerce Clause, 4 arguing that
lumber manufacturing was "manufacturing," not "commerce," and therefore
not within the scope of the interstate commerce power.'42 While the Darby
Court determined that manufacturing was neither commerce, an instrumentality
of commerce, nor a channel of commerce,'43 it nevertheless upheld the Act.
Manufacturing, according to the Court, triggered the third prong of Jones &
Laughlin-it was an activity that substantially affected interstate com-
merce.'" If Congress may regulate the transaction itself, the Darby Court
reasoned, it can regulate the initial step of the transaction.' 45 Under this rea-
soning, since "interstate commerce" clearly embodied the transportation of the
final product-lumber-then Congress may also regulate the initial step of
processing the timber into the lumber. Darby also took the Commerce Clause
power and the "substantial affects" test a step further than Jones & Laughlin.
137. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 38.
138. Id. This notion reflects the separation of powers doctrine, see supra note 18. While this
Comment touches on the principles of this doctrine, it does not address this doctrine directly or
how United States v. Lopez altered or affected the doctrine. However, among other implications,
Lopez perhaps threatens bicameralism-by perhaps allowing the courts to sidestep adjudication
and make the empirical decisions traditionally left for Congress.
139. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
140. Darby, 312 U.S. at 108-09.
141. Id. at I11.
142. Id. at 111-12.
143. See id. at 113. The appellee challenged application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
lumber manufacturing. Id. at 108.
144. Id. at 117. Darby also overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which
previously rejected application of the FLSA to manufacturers. Darby, 312 U.S. at 116-17.
145. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 117.
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Darby essentially granted Congress an unchecked power over interstate com-
merce, making the effect of the decision twofold. On the one hand, the Court
acknowledged a police-like power over commerce."4 Darby asserted that
Congress may prohibit activities that violate Congress's sense of public moral-
ity. Thus, the Court allowed federal regulation of labor conditions, not only
because labor conditions substantially affected interstate commerce, but be-
cause Congress found substandard labor conditions "noxious."'47 This con-
cept was not novel to the Court; in the commerce-prohibiting cases"4 the
Court allowed Congress to prohibit the movement of "evil" articles of com-
merce across state lines.'49 However, Darby pushed this concept even fur-
ther. The Court held that its role, in reviewing an act of Congress, was not to
consider Congress's motive-whether to regulate an "evil" or to regulate
"commerce."'25" In other words, not only did Darby uphold a police-like
power, but the decision also ensured that this power would remain relatively
unchecked.
The Darby Court's interpretation of Congress's power to regulate com-
merce pushed the constitutional envelope. First, the Constitution did not enu-
merate a congressional police power. Darby was not the first case to allow
Congress to use the commerce power to accomplish police-power ends. 5'
But Darby ensured that Congress could continue to use the Commerce Clause
to accomplish police-like regulations, and have free reign over the use of the
Commerce Clause in this way, without judicial oversight.' Darby effective-
ly stated that a court's role, while reviewing the congressional use of the Com-
merce Clause, was not to consider whether Congress was actually motivated
by a burden to interstate commerce, or if Congress simply wanted to regulate
the morality of the nation.
Darby, while expanding congressional power, did not mark the most ex-
pansive reading of the Commerce Clause. One year later, the Court held that
one person's home-consumption of wheat substantially affected interstate com-
merce.'53 In Wickard v. Filburn,54 the Court concluded that the Commerce
146. Id. at 113.
147. Seeid. at 113.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96. This Comment refers to these cases as the
commerce -prohibiting cases because the Court allowed Congress to prohibit the movement across
state lines of items Congress perceived as "evil" or "immoral." See e.g., Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
149. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491 (stating that the ability of Congress to regulate the use of the
"channels" of commerce has been frequently sustained and "no longer open to question").
150. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
152. At least one scholar, Gerald Gunther, asserts that the judicial noninterference advocated
by Darby gave Congress a "superbootstrap." GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW 135 (12th
ed. 1991). Gunther noted that the "superbootstrap" of "judicial noninterference is at its greatest
when Congress prohibits the crossing of state lines." Id.
153. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942). The Court upheld application of the Agri-
culture Adjustment Act of 1938 to Filburn's noncommercial, purely local consumption of wheat
because of the ultimate effect of local consumption on interstate commerce when considered in the
aggregate. Id. at 128-29.
154. 317 U.S. 11I (1942).
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Clause reaches noncommercial, intrastate activities that impose only a trivial
impact on commerce when isolated, yet have a profound impact when aggre-
gated.' In Wickard, the Court reviewed the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938.56 The Act was Congress's response to an overproduction of wheat.
Because the farmers produced more than the country bought or exported, Con-
gress passed the Agriculture Adjustment Act to regulate-and prevent-this
surplus. t'17 The Act specified the maximum amount of wheat a farmer could
produce." 8 It prohibited a person from growing more than the allotted
amount of wheat, even if the farmer intended to use this excess for home-con-
sumption. The Act allotted Filbum, a wheat farmer, 11.1 acres and a yield of
20.1 bushels. 59 Filbum exceeded this allotment by harvesting 23 acres and
239 bushels of wheat, subjecting him to a penalty of twenty-nine cents a bush-
el."6 Filburn challenged the Agricultural Adjustment Act as beyond
Congress's commerce power. He argued that the Act reached his individual
consumption, and that individual consumption does not substantially affect
interstate commerce.'' The Supreme Court disagreed. While the Act in ef-
fect reached into individual homes and regulated individual consumption, this
individual consumption does substantially affect interstate commerce.' 62 In
the aggregate, if every farmer produced the allotted maximum plus an amount
of wheat to consume in the home, then none of these farmers would buy the
wheat produced and sold on the market. Thus, there would still be an
overproduction of wheat, the condition addressed by the Act. The Court reiter-
ated that Congress could regulate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, and held that home-consumption of wheat substantially affects the
interstate commerce of wheat. The Court upheld the Agriculture Adjustment
Act.
163
Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and Wickard expansively interpreted the scope
of the Commerce Clause and allowed Congress broad reach under the com-
merce power. Jones & Laughlin created the "substantial affects" test. Darby
applied the "substantial affects" test, and in the process, invented a congressio-
nal police power. The Wickard Court permitted federal regulation of trivial,
intrastate activities, that when considered in the aggregate, substantially affect-
ed interstate commerce. Combined, these interpretations allowed Congress to
use its commerce power to police even trivial, noncommercial acts that in the
aggregate substantially affected interstate commerce--either by their nature or
simply because Congress found the activity morally offensive. Congressional
use of the Commerce Clause seemed unlimited.
155. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-25. The Court analyzed the Agriculture Adjustment Act under
the third prong of Congress's interstate commerce power, activities substantially affecting inter-
state commerce. Id.
156. 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1938).
157. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115.
158. Id. at 114-15.
159. Id. at 114.
160. Id. at 114-15.
161. Id. at 118-19.
162. Id. at 115-16.
163. Id.
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c. The Later Cases-The Modern Era
The modem era of Commerce Clause cases built on the principles estab-
lished in Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and Wickard. Yet the expansion of federal
power remained subtle. Although the Court simply applied valid precedent,
each time it applied the "substantial affects" test Congress's commerce power
grew. In the mid-to-late 1960s, the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act under
the Commerce Clause."M It seems the Court wanted to allow Congress to
regulate racial discrimination, and the Commerce Clause provided Congress
the necessary reach of power to do so;165 the Court admitted that Congress
was legislating against the "moral wrong" of discrimination rather than a com-
mercial activity." 6 The Court, in these later civil rights cases, acknowledged
that racial discrimination was not a commercial activity and by its nature
164. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (finding an amusement park a place of public ac-
commodation and within the ambit of the Civil Rights Act and the interstate commerce power
because food served at the park moved in interstate commerce and the park served interstate trav-
elers); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the applica-
tion of the Civil Rights Act to hotels since racial discrimination adversely affects interstate travel
which in turn affects interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (uphold-
ing the application of the Civil Rights Act to restaurants near interstate highways because of the
adverse affect of racial discrimination on interstate travel and therefore on interstate commerce).
165. Gerald Gunther, a noted constitutional law scholar, wrote a letter to the Department of
Justice in the summer of 1963. His letter stressed that the Supreme Court should not rely on the
Commerce Clause as a source of power for Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act. For an excerpt
of this letter, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 148 (12th ed. 1991). Gunther wrote,
I was happy to see that the Administration has put off for a few days the submission of
its new civil rights proposals to Congress. I hope that the additional time will permit the
Justice Department to reexamine its reported decision to rely exclusively on the com-
merce clause .... [T]he substantive content of the commerce clause would have to be
drained beyond any point yet reached to justify the simplistic argument that all intrastate
activity may be subjected to any kind of national regulation merely because some formal
crossing of an interstate boundary once took place, without regard to the relationship
between the aim of the regulation and interstate trade. The aim of the proposed anti-dis-
crimination legislation, I take it, is quite unrelated to any concern with national com-
merce in any substantive sense.
Id. at 148-49.
166. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). The Court stat-
ed:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs ... rendered its enactments no less
valid. In framing Title I1 of [the Civil Rights] Act Congress was also dealing with what
it considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming
evidence of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial inter-
course.
Id.
In upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Court had to overcome the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which the Court held that the public accommodation statute of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 336, was unconstitutional because it hindered private activ-
ity, rather than limiting itself to state action. Mark E. Herrmann, Looking Down From the Hill:
Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpreta-
tions of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 568-69 (1992). The Court distinguished
these cases from Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), because
Congress used the Commerce Clause, not the 14th Amendment, to enact Title II. The Act of 1875
did not limit its jurisdiction to places involving or affecting interstate commerce. Thus, the Court
in the later civil rights act cases only had to determine if the Commerce Clause empowered Con-
gress to regulate racial discrimination.
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occurred on the local level.' 67 But the Court found that racial discrimination
in hotels, inns, and restaurants deterred interstate travel.'68 The decrease in
travel directly correlated to a diminished need for supplies moving in interstate
commerce.'69 This diminished need, in turn, substantially affected interstate
commerce. 170
In these later civil rights cases, the Court noted the connection between
the regulated activity and the use of goods moving in interstate commerce.
The Court allowed Congress to regulate activities that adversely impacted the
supply and demand of interstate goods. Generally, the "commercial enter-
prise"-the amusement park, the restaurant, or the hotel-adversely affected
the need for supplies by discriminating against customers, thereby reducing the
number of patrons, or amount of interstate supplies used. For example, in
Daniel v. Paul,'' the Court applied the Civil Rights Act to Lake Nixon
Club, an amusement park in Little Rock, Arkansas, which denied admission to
African-Americans. Because the park included a snack bar which served food
and drinks obtained from out-of-state sources, the entire park fell within the
ambit of the Commerce Clause.' The Daniel v. Paul decision followed the
principles established in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States'73 and
Katzenbach v. McClung."4 Both cases upheld the Civil Rights Act as falling
within Congress's commerce power, since hotels, inns, and restaurants ser-
viced interstate travelers.'
167. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258. The Court said, "If it is interstate commerce that feels
the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the squeeze." Id. (citing United
States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)).
168. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964) In Heart of
Atlanta, the Court noted that because of the current mobility of the nation's populace, and the
increase in travel of citizens, discriminatory practices that inhibit travel have a larger impact on
interstate commerce than ever before. Id. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964),
reiterated this point. The Court stated that "refusals to service Negroes have imposed burdens both
upon the interstate flow of food and upon the movement of products generally." Id. Another of
these later civil rights cases, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), did not decide the case based
on the travel of citizens or the movement of foods. There, the Court determined that the amuse-
ment park fell within Title It's description of a "public accommodation," as an area selling foods
obtained from out of state sources, and therefore within the ambit of Title II. Id. at 301.
169. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at
304.
170. Daniel. 395 U.S. at 305; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at
304.
171. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
172. Daniel, 395 U.S. at 305-06.
173. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
174. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
175. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 251. In justifying the application of the Act by virtue
of service to interstate travelers, the Court explained that,
the fact that certain kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved
in interstate commerce to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the commerce pow-
er is not necessarily dispositive of the same question today. Our populace had not
reached its present mobility, nor were facilities, goods and services circulating as readily
in interstate commerce as they are today. Although the principles which we apply today
are those first formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden ... the condi-
tions of transportation and commerce have changed dramatically, and we must apply
those principles to the present state of commerce.
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Later, in 1968, the Court used these principles to uphold the application of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 7 6 to noncommercial enterprises.'77 In
Maryland v. Wirtz,' the Court allowed the federal government to impose
the provisions of the FLSA on hospitals and schools.'79 Hospitals and
schools, although not commercial enterprises, used goods moving in interstate
commerce, just as the hotels, inns, and amusement parks involved in the civil
rights cases of the late 1960s."" The Court reasoned that poor working con-
ditions led to labor strife in all enterprises, commercial and noncommercial
alike. Labor strife, which led to work stoppages, substantially affected inter-
state commerce because it reduced the need to purchase goods moving in
interstate commerce.' 8'
The "substantial affects" test continually validated federal regulations-it
seems the Supreme Court never met a federal regulation that it didn't like. In
the 1970s, the Court upheld a congressional criminal law. Perez v. United
States'82 allowed Congress to criminalize loan sharking because organized
crime profited from loan sharking." 3 The heads of organized crime, the
Court reasoned, "victimized" business persons by giving them extraordinarily
large loans at extraordinarily high interest rates, making the loan nearly impos-
sible to repay. 4 Once the owner defaulted on the loan, the head of the orga-
nized crime group took over the legitimate business.'85 The organized crime
head then used this legitimate business as a lawful front for illegal activi-
ties. 86 This process affected business, and business affected interstate com-
merce. 7 Therefore, Congress could regulate--criminalize-loan sharking,
since loan sharking substantially affected interstate commerce. 88
176. Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (cunent version at 29
U.S.C. § 201 (1988)).
177. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
178. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
179. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 194.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
183. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 155.
184. Id. at 156-57. The Court believed that the loan shark racket "provides organized crime
with its second most lucrative source of revenue, extracts millions from the pockets of people,
coerces its victims into the commission of crimes against property, and causes the takeover by
racketeers of legitimate businesses. Id. at 156.
185. Id. at 156-57.
186. Id. at 155-57.
187. Id.
188. Perez upheld the federal criminal act since the crime was "commercial" in nature. But
Justice Stewart's dissent in that case warned that the Perez rationale might be applied to other
crimes, even those lacking the "interstate" connection obvious in Perez. Id. at 157-58 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart noted that all crimes are "a national problem," so the fact that loan
sharking is a national problem should not justify congressional criminalization of loan sharking.
He stated that it is also not enough to label loan sharking as a crime with interstate characteristics,
for all crimes have these interstate characteristics. He then stated that to assert that Congress may
enact this criminal law since loan sharking adversely affects interstate business does not distin-
guish loan sharking from any other crime, since all crimes will affect businesses one way or an-
other. Id. For a thorough discussion of federal criminal laws, and the effect of Lopez on these
laws, see James M. Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of
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The Supreme Court continued to allow the Commerce Clause to reach far
into individual and local activities. A decade after Perez, the Court validated
congressional regulation of pollution. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Coal Reclamation Ass'n, s9 the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA),"9" which forces strip miners to reclaim, or repair
the damage wreaked upon, the land once the miner finishes mining. In the late
1970s, an association of coal producers engaged in strip mining sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of SMCRA, 9' challeng-
ing that the Act violated the Commerce Clause. The Court held that SMCRA
was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power because coal mining
adversely affected the value and utility of the land.'92 Mining severely affect-
ed the value of the land and the possible uses of that land. This substantially
affected interstate commerce, by altering where certain activities could take
place and what activities could be done on the land.'93
5. Limits on Congressional Power
Although the Jones & Laughlin era and the modem era cases acknowl-
edged some limits on congressional commerce power, the Court seemingly
paid only lip-service to those limits. The Court never actually used the limits
to strike down congressional regulations. The Jones & Laughlin Court warned
against expunging the distinction between local and national affairs,'94 in the
hopes that Congress, of its own volition, would tread lightly in areas of state
authority.'95 The Jones & Laughlin Court stated that Congress's use of the
Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795 (1994).
While criminal law is traditionally left to the states, federal criminal laws have intersected
with the states authority in these areas. Since 1980, the case load for federal criminal cases has
grown by over fifty percent. Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 706 (1995).
189. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
190. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1976).
191. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 273.
192. Id. at 277-81.
193. Nearly all environmental laws are enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. With the
use of the "substantial affects" test, Congress can regulate virtually all aspects of the environment,
including prohibitions on certain actions, standards for air, water, and land quality, and environ-
mental clean-ups. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Environmental Law in Australia and the United
Staies: A Comparative Overview, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 503 (1995).
194. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30, 37 (1937). The Court warned
that,
the scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual system of govem-
ment and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them ... would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local.
Id.
195. See id. at 30. As New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) verifies, state authori-
ty over an area places a very narrow limit on the Clause and congressional power. New York held
that our dual system only prevents the federal government from commandeering the states to enact
federal policy. Id. at 175, 179.
The Tenth Amendment, the issue addressed in New York, suffers from a tumultuous history
which this Comment does not address. This Comment focuses on United States v. Lopez as it
affects Congress's interstate commerce power and its previously unlimited authority. This Com-
ment does not address how the Lopez decision affects the Tenth Amendment and state and federal
power. Yet when one speaks of congressional Commerce Clause power, one also speaks of the
sovereign powers retained by the states through the Tenth Amendment. For a glimpse of the Tenth
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Commerce Clause should not "obliterate" the distinction between national and
local affairs."' However, that said, the Court then proceeded to develop a
framework for Commerce Clause cases that paved the road for Congress's
expansive commerce power.
Other cases acknowledged different "limits" on Congress's commerce
power, albeit never using those limits to actually stop a congressional action.
In Darby and Wickard, the Court "limited" congressional authority by remind-
ing Congress to respect the natural boundaries of the "substantial affects" test,
and regulate only activities that have a substantial affect on interstate com-
merce.'97 The word "substantial," modifying "affect," limits congressional
regulations to those activities with a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
not just any effect.
In another set of cases, the Court emphasized that rational basis review
limits congressional action under the Commerce Clause.'98 "Rational basis
review" signifies the standard of review, or the strictness of scrutiny, the Court
uses when reviewing legislation; "rational basis" means Congress must have
acted reasonably, or rationally. McCulloch v. Maryland'9 established rational
basis review as a threshold requirement for all legislation. Under this standard
of review, the Court considers first whether the legislative goal is reasonable
and legitimate. If the ends are legiiimate, then the Court determines if the
means Congress chose to accomplish that goal are rational, or reasonable."
Congressional actions must always be rational.2"'
While each era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence brought a different
perspective on the proper Commerce Clause analysis, one aspect of the analy-
sis remained consistent: the Court continually applied "rational basis" review.
This means that the Court, while applying the "semantics" approach," 2 the
Amendment's history, see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (holding state schools and
hospitals subject to the FLSA); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overrul-
ing Wirtz in part by holding that state employers are not subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of
Cities and subjecting state employers, once again, to the FLSA). The Supreme Court further ad-
dressed the Tenth Amendment in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); and United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678
(1982).
196. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30.
197. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
119-20 (1941). Wickard exemplifies how the word "substantial" is really an insubstantial limit. If
one person's home consumption of wheat is substantial, it is hard to imagine what is not substan-
tial.
198. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Coal and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-80
(1981); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (stat-
ing that rational review limits Congress); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 264, 299-301 (1964)
(asserting that Congress must act rationally); see infra text accompanying notes 351-70 (revealing
how rational basis review rarely actually limits Congress).
199. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated, "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
200. Id.; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80.
201. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 65-73.
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direct/indirect effects test,"3 or the "substantial affects" test,20 4 consistently
applied these tests with the minimal scrutiny of "rational basis review." The
Court determined whether Congress could reasonably conclude that the action
in question fell within the definition of "commerce, 20 5 imposed a direct ef
fect on interstate commerce,2 °6  or substantially affected interstate
commerce" 7 As a limit on Congress, rational basis review posed a minor
obstacle for Congress, but the Court recognized it as a limit on Congress
nonetheless."' °
This tradition of relaxed judicial scrutiny when reviewing legislation
passed under the Commerce Clause is vital, whether viewed as a limit on
Congress or the Court. The tradition, which began with McCulloch v. Mary-
land, plays an important role in the background of Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. While the Court changed its approach to the "proper" Commerce
Clause analysis several times, it continually, almost unquestionably, applied
the lightest judicial scrutiny, rational basis review.
6. A Summary of Congress's Commerce Clause Power Prior to Lopez
By 1995, the United States Supreme Court established that Congress may
regulate three areas of commerce: the use of the channels of commerce,"°
203. See supra text accompanying notes 101-21.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 122-214.
205. See supra text accompanying note 65.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80.
208. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (stating that rational review limits Congress); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 264, 299-301 (1964) (asserting that Congress must act rationally).
In effect, rational basis review actually poses more of a limit on the courts than on Con-
gress. In McCulloch, the Supreme Court, in establishing the threshold of rational basis review,
also warned courts that judicial attempts to question the necessity of a law passes the line circum-
scribing the judiciary and treads on legislative ground. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. The
dissent in E.C. Knight repeated this warning, and the Court has consistently upheld this principle.
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 39 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421, for the proposition that sound construction of the Constitu-
tion allows legislative discretion regarding the means by which it exercises its powers). Minimum
rationale review narrows the scope of judicial inquiry. If a rational basis exists for the law, then
the only question left for the courts is whether Congress chose a means reasonably adapted to the
ends. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 262; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304;
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941). This review questions not the merit of those
ends, but the reasonableness of the relationship between the ends and the chosen means.
While in theory "rational basis" review poses an obstacle for Congress, courts hesitate to
enter the prohibited territory of second-guessing legislation. When faced with a choice, courts
often choose statutory interpretations which save-rather than destroy-the legislation. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 3 (1937) (stating that the NLRA can be construed as
"operating within a sphere of constitutional authority and is therefore constitutional). Minimum
rationale, or rational basis, review is a search for any conceivable rational basis for an act. Courts
may speculate as to what Congress could reasonably have thought; they are not limited to factors
that actually motivated Congress. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. Rational basis does not require
legislatures to create a record for judicial review. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478
(1980).
This tradition of relaxed judicial scrutiny is important, and the Lopez decision perhaps
altered this tradition. See infra text accompanying notes 199-208 for a discussion of rational basis
review, the limits on the courts and Congress, and Lopez.
209. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917).
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the instrumentalities of commerce--or the things or persons in interstate com-
merce, 2 1 and those activities that have a substantial relation to interstate
commerce-those that substantially affect interstate commerce. 2 ' Courts ana-
lyze these three bases as distinct areas of congressional authority.2 2 While
earlier, precedents define the activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce, the cases left unanswered what activities do not substantially affect
interstate commerce. In United States v. Lopez, the Court finally acknowledged
that the Commerce Clause does have boundaries.
II. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ2 3
On March 12, 1992, Alfonso Lopez brought a .38 caliber handgun to
school." 4 He planned to sell the gun to a fellow student, who wanted the
gun for a gang fight.21 5 School authorities received an anonymous tip and
confronted Lopez about the gun.2"' Lopez confessed, and the police arrested
and charged him under Texas law. 2 7 The following day, federal agents
charged Lopez with violating the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,28
210. See Shreveport Rates Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351-53 (1914).
211. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
212. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (treating the three areas of the Clause,
the instrumentalities and persons and things in commerce, the channels of commerce, and activi-
ties substantially affecting interstate commerce, as analytically distinct).
213. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
214. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
215. Debra L. Farmer, United States v. Lopez: The Fifth Circuit Declares the Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990 an Unconstitutional Extension of Congressional Power Under the Com-
merce Clause, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1674, 1674 (1994) (citing Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342,
1345 (5th Cir. 1993)).
216. Id.
217. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. State authorities charged Lopez under Texas Penal Code §
46.03(a)(1). Id. The Texas Code provides in relevant part:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with a firearm, . . . he intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly goes:
(1) on the physical premises of a school, an educational institution, or a pas-
senger transportation vehicle of a school or an educational institution, whether
the school or educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to
written regulations or written authorization of the institution.
TEX. PENAL ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
218. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. 11 1988). The Gun-Free School Zone Act provides in relevant
part, "It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A).
Section (q)(1)(B) of the Act sets forth exceptions:
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the possession of a firearm-
(i) on private property not part of school grounds;.
(ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the State in which the
school zone is located or a political subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or
political subdivision requires that, before an individual obtain such a license, the law
enforcement authorities of the State or political subdivision verify that the individual is
qualified under the law to receive the license;
(iii) which is
(I) not loaded and;
(II) in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack which is on a motor
vehicle;
(iv) by an individual for use in a program approved by a school in the school zone;
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which prohibited the possession of a firearm within a school zone. State au-
thorities then dropped the charges brought under Texas law.2 9
A federal grand jury indicted Lopez on one count of knowing possession
of a firearm in a school zone.22" Lopez moved for dismissal, alleging that the
Act exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.2 ' The district
court denied the motion and convicted Lopez of violating section 922(q) of the
Gun-Free School Zone Act.222 The district court then sentenced Lopez to six
months imprisonment and two years supervised release.2  Lopez appealed to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, again asserting that Congress exceeded its
power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Gun-Free School Zone Act
of 1990.224
The Fifth Circuit agreed with Lopez. 225 The court found that Congress
failed to show, through legislative findings or legislative history, how gun
possession in a school zone affects interstate commerce. 226 Absent such find-
ings, the court could see no relation between commerce and gun possession in
a school zone.227 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Act exceeded
Congress's interstate commerce power. The government appealed to the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court.228 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
(v) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a school in a
school zone and the individual or an employer of the individual;
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capacity; or
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while traversing school premises
for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting, if the entry
on school premises is authorized by school authorities.
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(B).
Congress later revised the Act to include findings articulating the nexus between gun pos-
session in a school zone and interstate commerce. For these findings, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)
(1994). Briefly stated, these revised findings showed that Congress considered crimes, particularly
crimes involving guns and drugs, to be a nationwide problem. Congress then, in these findings,
stated that firearms move in interstate commerce, and have been found in increasing numbers in
and around schools. Id. Presumably, this was a response to the Fifth Circuit's reliance on legisla-
tive findings, invalidating the statute because of the absence of findings, that prompted this revi-
sion. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993). In Lopez, however, the Supreme Court
dealt with the portions of the Gun-Free School Zone Act valid when Alfonso Lopez brought the
gun to school. Thus, the Court decided Lopez before the addition of the legislative findings assert-
ing the nexus between interstate commerce and gun possession in a school zone.





224. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345, 1346 (5th Cir. 1993).
On November 29, 1990, Congress enacted the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 as §
1702 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 4789,
4844-45. It became effective sixty days later. Pub. L. 101-647, § 1702(b)(4). The Act was passed
in response to the "devastating tide of firearm violence in our Nation's schools." Petitioner's Brief
at 3, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260) (quoting Representative
Feighan). Senator Kohl stated that the Act was a continuation of congressional concern for the
nation's classrooms. The Senator felt that gun free school zones were an "important step in fight-
ing gun violence and keeping our teachers and children safe." Petitioner's Brief at 3-4.
225. Petitioner's Brief at 3-4; Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1352.
226. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1359-60.
227. Id.
228. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
[Vol. 73:1
GUNNING DOWN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
result: Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause when
enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.229
A. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia: The Majority
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, differed from
the decision issued by the Fifth Circuit. For the Fifth Circuit, the absence of
findings alone rendered the Act invalid.23° While the Chief Justice implied
that findings would have been helpful,23" ' this omission was secondary to the
majority's decision that gun possession in a school zone does not substantially
affect interstate commerce.232 The Court's failure to affirmatively repudiate
the Fifth Circuit's reliance on findings implies that findings may be required.
The Lopez Court first summarized the reach of the Commerce Clause. The
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the channels and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and the activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.233 Gun possession, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
is neither a channel nor an instrumentality of commerce.234 This dismissal of
the first two categories of interstate commerce, the instruments and channels
of commerce, would seemingly be because section 922(q) concerned "posses-
sion" of a gun rather than the "sale" of guns or the "movement" or "trans-
portation" of guns across state lines. "Possession" does not neatly fit into one
of these more obvious categories.235 The rest of the majority opinion focused
on the effect of gun possession on interstate commerce. 236 The Court con-
cluded that the effect on commerce is not substantial.237
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Gun-Free School Zone Act func-
tioned outside the Commerce Clause. 238 He argued that gun possession was
not an economic enterprise,239 and that it was not a necessary part of a
229. Id.
230. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1352.
231. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
232. Id. at 1634. Chief Justice Rehnquist used Lopez to "settle some uncertainty" about the
Commerce Clause. He said that while some precedent might suggest that Congress can regulate
activities that affect interstate commerce, the regulated activity must substantially affect interstate
commerce. Id. at 1628-30.
233. Id. at 1629-30. See supra text accompanying notes 122-272.
234. Id. at 1630. Chief Justice Rehnquist does not explain why commerce is not an instrumen-
tality nor a channel of commerce. He simply stated:
The first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of: § 922(q) is not a regu-
lation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt to prohibit
the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce; nor can
§ 922 be justified as a regulation by which Congress has sought to protect an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or a thing in interstate commerce. This, if § 922(q) is to be
sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.
Id.
235. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not explain this "dismissal" of the Act as regulating neither a
channel nor an instrumentality. This Comment presumes, however, that this is perhaps why the
Chief Justice did so.
236. Id. at 1630-34.
237. Id. at 1634.
238. See id. at 1630-31. For the text of the Gun-Free School Zone Act, see supra note 218.
239. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. This is not the first time Congress has sought to regulate
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larger, valid "regulatory scheme." 2" While Lopez did not explicitly require a
congressional articulation of a nexus to commerce, Chief Justice Rehnquist
indicated that such a showing may have provided the Court the explanation it
wanted, or needed, to uphold the Act."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected all of the government's justifications for
regulating gun possession under the Commerce Clause. First, the government
argued that gun possession in school zones deterred travel.242 The govern-
ment contended that citizens would be reluctant to move if relocation would
result in sending their children to schools in areas that did not penalize gun
possession.243 These deterrents on travel, therefore, diminish the economic
productivity of these areas and ultimately affect interstate commerce.24
The government also argued that guns lead to crime, and crime imposes
higher insurance costs on the community.2 45 These higher prices affect com-
merce by artificially increasing the cost of living.2' The government's argu-
ments failed to persuade the Court. Despite the arguable effect on travel, in-
creased costs, and ultimately on interstate commerce, the Court believed that
this nexus unduly tread on the states' power to regulate criminal activities.247
"possession" of an item, or possession of a firearm for that matter. For example, Congress regulat-
ed the possession of a firearm by a felon-making it unlawful for a felon to receive, possess, or
transport a firearm in commerce-in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1) (1968). Interestingly, the Supreme Court reviewed this law in United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). The Court, because of the jurisdictional element of § 1202, only had
to determine if Congress could regulate the possession of a firearm when it "affects" commerce.
Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4. The Court postponed the decision of whether Congress can regulate
"pure possession" to another case when the facts demand that the Court make that decision. Id.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the government's argument that Congress repeatedly regulates
firearms as well as firearm possession. The Fifth Circuit decided that those statutes lacking a
jurisdictional element-findings stating the nexus to interstate commerce-regulated commercial
actions involving the firearms business, not simple possession by an individual. United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1348 (1993). The Fifth Circuit considered the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. §
922(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1992) (governing false statements in the purchase of a firearm); § 922(b)(1)
& (2) (regulating the sale of a firearm to a minor); § 922(b)(4) (governing the sale of certain
firearms, such as machine guns, rifles, and automatic weapons); § 922(m) (requiring dealers to
keep certain records).
240. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Chief Justice did not explain this point. Presumably,
though, if the Gun-Free School Zone Act had been "part of a larger regulatory scheme," clearly
governing interstate commerce, then perhaps the Court would have imported the connection be-
tween the larger regulation and interstate commerce onto the Gun-Free School Zone Act, as it was
simply the smaller portion of the regulatory scheme.
241. Id. at 1631-32.
242. Id. at 1632. This argument reflects the principles used in the later civil rights cases, see
supra notes 164-75. In those cases, the Court allowed Congress to regulate discrimination because
of the adverse affect of discrimination on travel.
243. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; Petitioners Brief at 9, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995) (No. 93-1260).
244. See Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (No. 93-
1260).
245. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; Brief for the United States at 9, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (No.
93-1260). The government made this argument as separate from the "deterred travel" argument,
see supra text accompanying notes 242-43.
246. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
247. Id. If Congress can regulate gun possession in a school zone because it leads to crime
and crime imposes both economic and social costs on the community, then it may also regulate
burglary, for example, because burglary imposes these same costs.
[Vol. 73:1
GUNNING DOWN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Constitution did not grant authority to the federal government over crimi-
nal law; this power was reserved for the states.2"
The government additionally argued that gun possession in school zones
adversely affects education and consequently affects commerce because of the
intimate ties between education, national productivity, and commerce.249
Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejected this argument. He believed that acknowl-
edging such a tenuous connection would grant Congress unlimited power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause.25 He used family and domestic laws
to illustrate his point. Familial relations directly affect a child's school-
work."' For example, when a mother and father divorce, their children's
schoolwork may suffer, since divorce causes psychological and physical
trauma for many children." 2 Yet despite the detrimental effect of divorce on
children's schoolwork-and hence, on education and commerce-Congress
does not have the authority to regulate domestic law.253 But if the Court al-
lowed Congress to regulate gun possession simply because it affects school-
work, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned, it may also have the power to reg-
ulate divorce.2"4
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion stated that finding the connection be-
tween gun possession in a school zone and commerce required "piling infer-
ence on inference,"'25 and would give Congress a broad police power. Refer-
ring to Gibbons,"6 Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that the powers enumer-
ated in the Constitution did "not presuppose something not enumerated.""2 7
This reasoning, however, reflects not that gun possession has too tenuous an effect on
commerce, but that the "substantial affects" test is too broad. The test encompasses effects that,
although substantial, are best left to the states to regulate. It allows Congress to exercise authority
over activities that Congress was never intended for Congress to regulate. See infra text accom-
panying notes 371-416.
248. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 n.3. The Court does not explain how it distinguishes the
Constitution's "omission" to grant the federal government authority over criminal laws with feder-
al laws that criminalize other conduct, such as the loan-sharking law discussed and validated in
Perez. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Presumably, the difference depends on the
"concrete" connection between the criminalized conduct and interstate commerce, which the Court
found in Perez. This, however, might be distinction without a difference. For a discussion of fed-
eral criminal laws in relation to the Commerce Clause, see Chippendale, supra note 12.
249. Brief for the United States at 19-25, Lopez, (No. 93-1260).
250. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632-33.
251. Id.
252. Id. This Comment assumes this point as a logical inference from Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. He did not expand on this point.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1634.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9, 17-40 for a discussion of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
257. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195). Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted then Chief Justice Marshall, who stated:
It is not intended to say that these words [of the Commerce Clause] comprehend that
commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a
State ... and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it
may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than
one.... The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.
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In other words, the Court could not accept an argument that assumed the exis-
tence of authority the Framers did not enumerate for Congress.
B. Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor Concur
Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor concurred in the result of
Lopez.25 According to Kennedy, the nebulous history of Commerce Clause
precedent left Congress with imprecise definitional boundaries of its commerce
power.259 Kennedy and O'Connor cautioned, however, against returning to
the early conceptions of "commerce"2" and a judiciary that second-guessed
congressional judgments."' Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of
maintaining the "stability" of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it had
evolved to that point;262 he argued that judicial restraint was necessary to
protect stare decisis.263 That restraint, Justice Kennedy asserted, prevented
the Court from returning to an understanding of commerce "that would serve
only an 18th-century economy. '264 Justice Kennedy also argued that judicial
restraint would prevent the Court from returning to the time when the Court
undermined congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce with the
Court's own subjective determinations of the "sufficiency" of the interstate nexus.
265
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95. Chief Justice Rehnquist then stated that to uphold the Gun-Free
School Zone Act would require the Court "to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of
powers does not presuppose something not enumerated." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. He meant that
to allow Congress the authority over gun possession within school zones would be to presume
Congress has more authority than the Framers granted, and the states ceded, when forming the
Republic.
258. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring, with O'Connor joining). Justice
Kennedy wrote the concurring opinion.
259. Id. at 1636. Justice Kennedy referred to the era in which the Court determined the reach
of congressional power according to its definition of commerce and whether the regulated activity
fell within that definition without using any other standards for valid congressional commerce
regulations. For example, see United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (distinguishing
"manufacturing" from "commerce").
260. See supra text accompanying notes 35-73 for the early, narrow conceptions of com-
merce.
261. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637. Justice Kennedy referred to a time in the early 1930s when
the Court dismissed Congress's judgments and replaced them with the Court's own judgments.
See infra note 265 for an explanation of the Lockner era.
262. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1637.
263. Id. Justice Kennedy stated, "Stare decisis operates with great force in counseling us not
to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the congressional power to
regulate transactions of a commercial nature." Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. Presumably, Justice Kennedy was referring to the Lochner era, although the Justice
never explicitly cited Lochner. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court
reviewed a New York law governing the maximum hours a bakery employee could work and
labor conditions for that employee. Id. at 46. The issue was whether the law violated the bakers'
substantive due process right to contract. Id. at 51-53. The Court held that the law interfered with
the right to contract, id. at 53, but the decision did not end there. The Court stated, "It must be
conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by the state." Id. at 56. The
Court then continued,
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this character
is concerned, and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the ques-
tion necessarily arises: Is this [law] a fair, reasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary inter-
ference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty, or to enter into those
contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the
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Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor felt that the Gun-Free School Zone
Act upset the sensitive federal-state balance.2" The Justices argued that al-
most all conduct originates, concludes, or at least intertwines with commerce
at some point.26' Congress must therefore tread lightly when regulating areas
of state concern. The Gun-Free School Zone Act only criminalizes gun posses-
sion near a school,268 and traditionally, the states regulate education.269
While the states ceded many powers to the federal government when forming
the Republic, the states reserved the general police power. This police power
enables the states to fashion remedies that reflect local needs.27 Under this
argument, the states have sufficient power to enact their own measures against
guns in schools.27' Thus, the Gun-Free School Zone Act tramples on this ar-
ea of state concern and unnecessarily displaces state authority."2
support of himself and his family.
Id.
The Lochner decision led the Court for the next thirty years to invalidate several economic
and social laws. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 444 (12th ed. 1991). In other words,
the judiciary, instead of practicing its usual restraint, became more active when reviewing legisla-
tion. Modem justices reject the Lockner era of judicial intervention. Id. at 445. Gunther stated,
"Rejection of the Lochner heritage is a common starting point for modem Justices: reaction
against the excessive intervention of the 'Old Men' of the pre-1937 Court strongly influenced the
judicial philosophies of their successors." Id.
266. Justice Kennedy stated, "This case requires us to consider our place in the design of the
Government and to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Consti-




270. Id. at 1641. The Courts especially seek to protect the federal-state balance in areas where
the states have the ability to govern effectively. E.g., Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504 (1992); Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). Both these cases highlight the
rules of preemption. Preemption maintains that when a state law collides with the accomplishment
of a federal goal, the federal law preempts the state law; the law is void. Pacific Gas & Electric v.
State Energy Resource Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); see Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875). These cases analyze the
doctrine of independent state grounds. This doctrine establishes that the Supreme Court will de-
cline to decide a case if the state supreme court could adequately decide the issue by applying
state law. For a discussion of this doctrine, see Thomas E. Baker, 1994 Invitational Conference on
Courts and Jurisdiction in Federal States: The United States, Canada and Australia: A Catalogue
of Judicial Federalism in the United States, 46 S.C. L. REV. 835, 856 (1995).
271. For example, states with a large problem of guns in schools might choose to enact a
more strict law, imposing tougher penalties on violators. On the other hand, states or localities
with a small problem might enact a less strict law with more lax penalties. In addition, the states
and localities can fashion laws according to the "type of gun" problem that the locality faces. If
the problem is with handguns in an urban, populated area rather than hunting rifles in the rural
county, for example, the remedy might be different. The localities or states can also fashion their
needs according to the size of the school zone-in some areas, the school zone drawn by Con-
gress in the Gun-Free School Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (Supp. II. 1988), might be as large
as some towns.
272. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641. The Act does not explicitly displace state authority. The Act
does, however, partly foreclose state policy choices, especially in states where the legislature
would choose not to criminalize gun possession as harshly as the Gun-Free School Zone Act. Id.
Justice Kennedy states, "it [displaces state authority] by regulating an activity beyond the realm of
commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of the term." Id.
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C. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas also concurred in the Court's result.273 He agreed that
the judiciary needed to halt legislative power.274 Nevertheless, Justice Thom-
as noted that the "substantial affects" test gives Congress a police power over
almost all activities.275 He called for a test more faithful to the original un-
derstanding of the Commerce Clause, yet reflective of the modem economic
reality of an interdependent, commercial nation.276
Justice Thomas advanced a unique view of the issue by juxtaposing the
Commerce Clause's precedent with the Necessary and Proper Clause.277 Un-
der its commerce power, Congress may regulate all activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.278 The Constitution also empowered Congress to
take the necessary steps to exercise its enumerated powers.279 This Clause,
read in conjunction with the Court's interpretations of the Commerce Clause,
means that Congress may use necessary means to regulate activities substan-
tially affecting interstate commerce.28 ° Justice Thomas concluded that the
"substantial affects" test is superfluous because it "obliterates" the need for the
other enumerated powers. 8 Justice Thomas illustrated this idea in the con-
text of Congress's enumerated power to raise and support a Navy. 82 He ex-
plained that the Navy also substantially affects interstate commerce 283 by en-
couraging exportation of goods, since it arms the country with the ability to
protect those exports from pirating.284 Without that protection, citizens would
not export goods; these citizens would produce less and thereby diminish the
vitality of interstate commerce. If the Navy does not substantially affect inter-
state-or foreign--commerce, it at least is a necessary means by which Con-
gress can exercise its power to regulate activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce. Regardless, the "substantial affects" test renders the enumerat-
ed power to raise a Navy unnecessary. Justice Thomas used this example to
show that the "substantial affects" test has the same result on the rest of
Congress's enumerated powers, rendering these powers superfluous and un-
necessary.
Justice Thomas also rejected the "substantial affects" test because it elimi-
nates the utility of the Tenth Amendment as a check on Congress.285 The
273. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1642-43.
277. Id. at 1644. The Necessary and Proper Clause states, "[Congress shall have the power] to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any other Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18.
278. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644.
279. Id. For the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see supra note 277.
280. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
281. Id.
282. Id. The Constitution gives Congress the power to raise and support a Navy. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
283. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1645. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) greatly diminished the
[Vol. 73:1
GUNNING DOWN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
test, according to Justice Thomas, enables Congress to encroach upon state
powers in areas of state concern. Further, it extends legislative power beyond
the Framers' intent. Justice Thomas emphasized the Framers' awareness of
activities intimately tied to, but not a part of, commerce."' The Framers and
other early Americans, for example, understood that activities like manufactur-
ing and agriculture substantially affected commerce, yet they did not cede
power over these activities to the federal government." 7 They limited the
federal government's power to "interstate commerce.""28
Justice Thomas felt that the modern era case law, which established, af-
firmed, even expanded, the "substantial affects" test, misinterpreted Gib-
bons.89 Justice Thomas argued that when Chief Justice Marshall asserted
that Congress's commerce power does not reach activities that do not affect
more than one state,29" the Chief Justice meant to limit the reach of Con-
gress, not create the power over all activities that affect more than one state.
Under Justice Thomas's reasoning, the activity must affect more than one state
before Congress can regulate that activity. Justice Thomas's reading of the
Chief Justice's statement in Gibbons views the definition of "among" as the
ceiling, rather than the floor, of Congress's commerce power.' While Jus-
tice Thomas did not call for wholesale abandonment of recent precedent, he
called for a more tempered jurisprudence faithful to the Constitution.2
D. The Dissents
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Breyer, and Justice Ginsberg dis-
sented from the majority of the Lopez Court. Justice Stevens's dissent focused
on the tie between education and America's future economic vitality.293 He
believed that this nexus sufficiently satisfied Congress's "rational basis" bur-
den.294 Additionally, Justice Stevens believed that the judicial activism the
utility of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress. The Tenth Amendment only prevents
Congress from forcing the states to enact federal policy. Id. at 161. Justice Thomas felt that the
"substantial affects" test further diminished what was left of the utility of the Tenth Amendment.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645.
286. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). When interpreting the Commerce
Clause in Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall defined "among" by stating that Congress may not
reach activities that do not affect more than one state. Id. at 194. See supra text accompanying
notes 53-57. Justice Thomas felt that the Court and the dissent misconstrued this part of Gibbons.
He felt that Chief Justice Marshall never meant this "definition of among" to mean that Congress
could reach any activity that affects more than one state. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1646-50.
290. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
291. Quite possibly, this is a distinction without a difference. Justice Thomas viewed the
statement as a limit on Congress rather than the minimum reach of the commerce power. Read
either way, however, it seems that Congress still has the power over activities that "affect more
than one state."
292. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1650.
293. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Breyer's dissent
that the Constitution empowers Congress to protect the school environment. Id.; see infra text
accompanying notes 310-22.
294. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Souter, I., dissenting); see supra note 208 and infra text ac-
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Lopez majority advocated recalled the abhorred Lockner era of judicial
policymaking. 2" He did not analyze this comparison, but stated that he
agreed with the position taken by Justice Souter.296
Justice Souter criticized Justice Kennedy and O'Connor's "traditional state
function" analysis.297 Justice Souter argued that state authority over a particu-
lar area neither weakens nor displaces congressional authority,29 and that the
Constitution never promised that the federal government and the states would
act completely independently.299 According to Justice Souter, then, the Gun-
Free School Zone Act posed no federalism problem. The Constitution does not
mandate that the government cannot act in areas where the states are empow-
ered to act and the ability of the states to regulate gun possession in a school
zone does not weaken the federal government's ability to also regulate.3"
Justice Souter also focused on judicial deference to legislative decisions.
He called for judicial restraint,"0 reminding the Court of the frightening
Lockner era.3"2 Justice Souter believed that the Lopez decision advocates for
courts in the future to "defer" in Commerce Clause cases only when the courts
determine that the activity affects commerce "enough" to satisfy that particular
court. In Justice Souter's view, a court that accords legislative deference only
after the court's determination of "how much" an act affects commerce verges
on judicial policymaking." 3 Justice Souter also addressed the implications of
forcing Congress to include findings when legislating." 4 He argued that re-
quiring Congress to include findings meant that Congress would have to justi-
fy its policy choices.3 5 The result of this requirement is an implication that
the courts should review these policy choices, and hence, the wisdom of those
policy choices."a Justice Souter pointed out that under traditional "rational
companying notes 351-70 for a discussion of the rational basis standard of review.
295. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645. Justice Stevens, cited his own dissent in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2326-29 (1994), in which he referred to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). In Lochner, the Court substituted judicial policy for legislative determinations. See
supra note 265. The Court oversteps judicial boundaries and performs a legislative function when
the Court begins second-guessing legislative decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 351-70
(discussing judicial policymaking and Lopez).
296. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651. Justice Souter dissented in part because of the effect of Lopez
on judicial deference and judicial boundaries. See infra text accompanying notes 351-70.
297. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor
concurred in Lopez, focusing on the sensitive balance between state and federal government au-
thority. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72.
298. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654-55.
299. Id. at 1654.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See supra note 265 (explaining the Lochner era).
303. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654.
304. Id. at 1656.
305. Id.
306. Id. Justice Souter stated:
The resulting congressional obligation to justify its policy choices on the merits would
imply either a judicial authority to review the justification (and, hence, the wisdom) of
those choices, or authority to require Congress to act with some high degree of deliber-
ateness, of which express findings would be evidence. But review for congressional
wisdom would just be the old judicial pretension discredited and abandoned in 1937.
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basis" review, however, the courts do not question whether Congress acted
correctly, wisely, or deliberately." 7 "Rational basis" requires only that Con-
gress acted within the realm of reason."'8 Justice Souter argued that requiring
legislative findings, then, is inconsistent with the level of review applied to
Commerce Clause cases.3"9
Justice Breyer also dissented, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
and Justice Ginsberg.' Justice Breyer criticized the Court for considering
gun possession's effect on commerce in isolation rather than on its cumulative
effect.3 ' He then demonstrated how, in the aggregate, gun possession sub-
stantially affects commerce. First, he explained that education and commerce
are largely and intimately linked.3 2 Commercial enterprises seek educated
workers.3"3 High-skilled workers replace low-skilled workers.3 4 Enterprises
educate workers, hoping to upgrade employees and thereby increase productiv-
ity.3 ' Global competition depends on maintaining a well-educated popu-
lace.3 6 A serious threat to education, therefore, seriously threatens our econ-
omy,3 17 and in turn substantially affects interstate commerce.
3 18
Further, Justice Breyer demonstrated that guns pose a serious detriment to
education because more and more children bring guns to schools.3t 9 Children
in these schools suffer threats and witness violence and crime.320 Congress,
therefore, could reasonably conclude that guns deteriorate the learning environ-
ment and cripple commerce.32 ' Under Justice Breyer's theory that guns affect
education, and therefore, substantially affect commerce, Congress does have
the power to enact the Gun-Free School Zone Act and regulate gun posses-
sion. In Justice Breyer's opinion, this is exactly the type of authority with
which the Constitution-through the Commerce Clause-arms Congress.322
Justice Breyer also believed that the Lopez opinion contravened estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent.323 Gun possession in a school zone affects
commerce at least as much as loan sharking,324 homegrown wheat consump-
Justice Souter's fear presumably stems from the Lockner era, see supra note 265, an era in
the in which the courts replaced congressional wisdom with the courts' own beliefs. The Supreme
Court later discredited this period. Justice Souter warned against a return to this period in Lopez.




310. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 1658. Cumulative effects are important, as evidenced by Wickard, see supra text
accompanying notes 153-63.










322. Id. at 1661-62.
323. Id. at 1662.
324. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 182-88
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tion,325 and racial discrimination.326 Also, the Lopez Court denied Congress
the benefit of the doubt that courts usually grant Congress.327 Justice Breyer
pointed out that courts historically allowed Congress great deference when
determining a nexus between a regulated activity and interstate commerce.328
The Lopez Court withheld this deference by disregarding legislative expertise
in making these empirical judgments. 29
Justice Breyer further criticized the Court for, on the one hand, rejecting
early case law giving controlling force to nomenclature, and on the other hand,
invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act in part because it regulates what
the Court identified as a noncommercial activity.33° Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion noted that "section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its
terms has nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enter-
prise. ' 33' Justice Breyer criticized this portion of the opinion. To Justice
Breyer, the majority decided that gun possession did not meet a definition of
"commerce" nor a definition of an "economic enterprise. 332 Justice Breyer
reasoned that this mode of analysis revives a discredited era of reliance on
nomenclature and semantics, 33  mirroring the Court's refusal in E.C. Knight
to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act to sugar refining because "manufacturing"
was not "commerce. 334
III. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
Briefly stated, the Lopez Court held that Congress may regulate the chan-
nels and instrumentalities of commerce and the activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. 335 Gun possession is neither a channel nor an in-
strumentality, 3 6 and gun possession in a school zone does not substantially
(discussing Perez).
325. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see supra text accompanying notes 153-63.
326. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referring to the later civil rights
cases of Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964),
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
327. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1663 (referring to the deference usually accorded Congress, as illus-
trated in United States v. Womens Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949) and Mandeville
Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 351-70 for a discussion of judicial deference.
329. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657.
330. Making this distinction threatens the holdings of the later civil rights cases and other
legislation that regulates activities that are noncommercial in nature but otherwise substantially
affect interstate commerce.
331. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
332. Id. at 1663.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
334. United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see supra text accompanying notes 67-
73.
335. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
336. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate the things or persons in commerce.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Lopez Court did not analyze whether this category of valid regula-
tions encompasses "guns" and "gun possession." Nor did the concurring opinion or the dissent
opine that Congress might regulate guns and gun possession under this category of regulations.
However, several circuit court cases since Lopez have allowed federal regulation of items because
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affect interstate commerce.337 As a consequence, courts must "pile inference
on inference" to establish a link between interstate commerce and gun posses-
sion within a school zone. Congressional legislation based on such a link
exceeds Congress's commerce power.
The Lopez Court acknowledged that the Commerce Clause both empowers
and limits Congress, a concept disregarded for nearly half a century."' The
Constitution gives Congress a plenary power, but that power extends only to
interstate commerce.3" Lopez correctly recognized that not all activities fall
within the domain of interstate commerce.
While adherence to the intent of the Constitution requires this limit, the
Lopez Court used a poor analysis to impose the limit. The Court, knowing that
precedent paved the road for Congress's increasingly expansive power, abrupt-
ly declined to continue down that road.' The Court sent a message that it
would no longer defer to congressional commercial decisions absent the
Court's belief that the regulated activity, in fact, substantially affected inter-
state commerce.
Refusing to invent a congressional police power,34 the Court told Con-
gress to safeguard legislation by including findings342 in the legislation.
Lopez suggested that the Court, when confronting a regulation with a question-
able effect on commerce, will not speculate as to what Congress could ratio-
nally conclude. Rather, the Court wants to know what Congress actually con-
cluded. This implies that the judiciary is equipped with the authority to weigh
the merit of the legislative findings, and is not limited to the rationality
the items moved in interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir.
1995) (stating that machine guns connote interstate commerce); United States v. Robinson, 62
F.3d 234 (8th Cir. 1995) (observing that Congress did not exceed its authority in enacting a
carjacking statute).
337. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
338. Freilich, supra note 10. This Comment also asserts this point.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
340. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (stating that prior cases gave great
deference to Congress, nearly converting the commerce power to a police power).
341. Id.
342. Legislative findings aid courts when interpreting legislation to understand that legislation
and Congress's intent. The findings, sometimes, appear as a separate section to a statute, often
called the Purpose Clause. The Purpose Clause typically introduces the legislation. For a brief
explanation of the Purpose Clause, see JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 175-76 (2d
ed. 1986). In the case of legislation passed pursuant to the interstate Commerce Clause, Congress
might have an introductory section specifying the connection between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce. For example, in the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891 (1968)
(the Act the Supreme Court reviewed in Perez, supra text accompanying notes 182-88), Congress
made findings suggesting the nexus that Congress saw between interstate commerce and organized
crime. Section 201(a) of Pub. L. 90-321 provided these findings, stating that Congress found that
organized crime is an interstate problem, involving "billions of dollars" each year. § 201(a)(1).
"Extortionate credit transactions are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the means and instrumentalities of such commerce." § 201(a)(3). Congress
also modified the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 to include findings. For these findings, see
supra note 218.
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standard of review. 43 When a court assesses legislation according to its own
perceptions, it is legislating.
In addition to these troublesome implications, some questions arise out of
the analysis the Lopez Court applied in determining that gun possession does
not substantially affect interstate commerce. First, the Court misapplied the
"substantial affects" test and its modem-era precedent. Under the principles of
Jones & Laughlin,3 44  Darby,3 45  and Wickard,34  and applying the
methodology of the Civil Rights Cases,347 Hodel,314  and Perez,3 49 gun
possession in a school zone does substantially affect interstate commerce.
The problem the Court faced was not gun possession and its obscure
effect on commerce. The real problem was the expansive "substantial affects"
test. The test sees no limits. Most activities in our interdependent, commercial
society intertwine at some point with interstate commerce.35 Neither the
Framers' conception of commerce, the Constitution, nor Gibbons support the
test. The test must be limited, and not by the facts of one case but by its own
terms. The Court should have altered the "substantial affects" test. This does
not mean the Court needed to abandon the modem case law, or the entire test.
Adding a qualifying prong to the existing test would have allowed the test to
reach activities substantially affecting interstate commerce while preventing
federal regulation of activities beyond the Framers' vision of interstate com-
merce.
B. The Standard of Review and Judicial Policymaking
The Lopez Court did not explicitly raise the standard of review; the Court
did not even mention the standard of review when deciding that the Gun-Free
School Zone Act did not substantially affect interstate commerce. The
majority's analysis, however, raised the question of what level of review the
courts should apply in future Commerce Clause cases. Furthermore, the Court
"mentioned" that legislative findings would be helpful for the courts in the
future; as discussed below, this requirement of findings opens the door to
inappropriate judicial policymaking.
343. The Court said that findings would have helped the Court see the nexus between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce, Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The presence or absence of
the legislative findings was itself not determinative. Id. Yet the Court never needs findings to
weigh the rationality of an act. See infra text accompanying notes 355-65. By implying a need for
findings, the Court implies the ability to review the merits, not just the rationality, of these find-
ings.
344. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
345. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
346. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
347. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
348. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Coal and Reclamation Ass'n, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
349. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
350. This is especially true in light of the Court's prior decisions. If racial discrimination,
recreational trails, and pollution substantially affect interstate commerce, so too does gun posses-
sion in a school zone.
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The Lopez Court quickly dismissed the first two categories of the
Congress's interstate commerce power; the Court noted that gun possession is
neither a channel nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce.' Thus, for
Congress to constitutionally regulate gun possession, gun possession must
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 52 The Court refused to "pile in-
ference on inference" '353 to establish the connection between gun possession
in a school zone and interstate commerce, and consequently the Court struck
down the Act.354
The Court admitted, in its analysis, that it traditionally evaluates legisla-
tive findings independent of an activity's affect on commerce. 35 Yet the
Court indicated that findings could have saved the Act by pointing out the
connection between gun possession and interstate commerce.356 The Gun-
Free School Zone Act of 1990 contained no findings,357 and the Court re-
fused to import the findings from previous similar but distinct acts.3"8 While
the Court did not expand on the notion of legislative findings, it sent a clear
message to Congress: include findings. The Court did not mandate these find-
ings, and the validity of the Gun-Free School Zone Act did not turn on the
presence or absence of findings, but the Lopez Court certainly educated Con-
gress on what role findings play.
Traditionally, under "rational basis" review, if the court perceives any
plausible reason for congressional action, the inquiry ends.359 Legislation co-
mes to the courts with a presumption of constitutionality.3" Rational basis
review ensures that those attacking the rationality of an act negate every con-
ceivable basis that might support the act's rationality.36" ' This deference
351. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). The Court concluded that gun
possession in a school zone is neither a channel nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1634.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1631. The Court did not explain what it meant by this admission of an independent
evaluation for legislative findings. It seems impossible for a court to evaluate the findings without
also evaluating the rationality, and thus validity, of an act. The Court probably meant that the
existence or nonexistence of findings will not render an act invalid since the court weighs the
rationality of legislation based on what it speculates Congress reasonably thought, not what the
legislative findings articulate Congress thought.
356. Id.
357. Id. Congress amended the Act in 1994 to include findings articulating the nexus between
commerce and gun possession in a school zone. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(1)(A)-(1) (Supp. 1995).
Since authorities charged Lopez under the 1990 Act, the government did not rely on these subse-
quent findings to argue for the validity of the 1990 Act. Oral Arguments at 25, United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260). Subsequent findings do not reveal the motivations
and intent of the prior Congress.
358. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (affirming the Fifth Circuit's refusal to import findings since §
922(q) represents a sharp break from previous firearm legislation).
359. See supra text accompanying notes 198-208, supra note 208. Federal Communications
Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2100 (1993); United States R.R. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-79 (1980); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964).
360. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323 (1981) (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
361. Id.
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allows Congress to legislate, the judiciary to adjudicate, and the democratic
process to rectify improvident laws. 62 The Court understands that legislating
involves compromises and incongruent laws. The judiciary's ability to imagine
a better, more perfect solution does not render a law irrational. 63 Instead, the
Court gives deference to Congress so that Congress may perform the duties
that the Constitution charges3" and preserve congressional independence.
This traditional deference to Congress and presumption of rationality
played an important role in Lopez. Since findings bear no significance under
typical rational basis review, and since the Lopez Court suggested that Con-
gress include findings, it seems the Court raised the standard of review to
something more than rational basis. Lopez allows courts to review not only the
legislation's rationality, but also the merits, need, and wisdom of the legisla-
tion. Applying rational basis review, a court would review an act and specu-
late as to what Congress might rationally have reasoned in deciding to regulate
that activity: what connection to interstate commerce there might be for that
activity. Now, under the reasoning of Lopez, the Court will look not to what
Congress might have thought, but demand findings expressing what Congress
did reason. The result will be that a court, in reviewing for those findings, will
then review the merits of those findings. The courts will decide the validity of
an act based on the court's understanding and acceptance of Congress's "rea-
sons." This is not a court applying "rational basis" review, but a court apply-
ing a standard of review more strict than rational basis.
In addition to raising the standard of review, the Lopez Court did not
thoroughly explain why the Gun-Free School Zone Act failed the "substantial
affects" test while other, seemingly similar regulations, passed the same test.
The Court noted that reaching the connection between gun possession and
interstate commerce required too many inferences.365 The Court did not ex-
plain whether the Act required more inferences than racial discrimination, for
example, or home consumption of wheat."6 In other words, it is hard to see
the distinction between gun possession and other activities that the Court up-
held as an activity Congress can validly regulate.
Since the Lopez Court offered lower courts little guidance or standards,
the decision leaves future courts to decide whether an activity affects com-
merce as much as the activities regulated in other, valid regulations, or if the
activity affects commerce as little as gun possession in a school zone. The
courts must assess whether the challenged regulation reflects the invalid regu-
lation of gun possession or if the challenged regulation reflects valid regula-
tions such as those concerning labor strife, racial discrimination, or surface
362. Beach, 113 S. Ct. at 2100; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); see also Hodel,
452 U.S. at 276; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294.
363. Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).
364. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980).
365. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
366. Compare Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (the later civil rights
cases) and supra text accompanying notes 164-75 with Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(upholding congressional regulation of one person's consumption of wheat at home) and supra
text accompanying notes 153-63.
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mining pollution.36' Arguably, the Court gave some guidance by stating that
gun possession was not an interstate activity, that it did not substantially affect
interstate commerce, and that gun possession had no concrete tie to com-
merce.3" Racial discrimination and surface mining pollution, however, are
not commercial activities and exist independently of economic activities as
well. Yet the Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Ace' and the Civil Rights Act.7 " The effect is that the lower courts have
no guidance as to why the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act and
the Civil Rights Act passed the "substantial affects" test and the Gun-Free
School Zone Act failed the same test; the lower courts must compare the
"concreteness" of the tie to commerce and the "substantiality" of the effect on
commerce of the challenged regulation to the "concreteness" and "substantial-
ity" of valid regulations. Courts must weigh the effect of the regulated activity
against activities previously upheld as having a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
This leaves lower courts with no standards other than its own perceptions,
biases, and beliefs. Perhaps this is a decision courts always faced under the
"substantial affects" test. If the Lopez decision stopped here, the decision
would not be so troublesome. Unfortunately, the Court also possibly raised the
standard of review to something more than minimum rationale. When the
Court makes factual decisions, assessing the constitutionality of legislation
according to the Court's perceptions of the legislation's necessity, and review
is less than deferential, then the result is a judiciary second-guessing the wis-
dom and workability of legislation. It is more than a judiciary properly adju-
dicating; it is a judiciary that legislates. In other words, it is not a court acting
in its proper functions. The courts adjudicate, according to the Constitution,
and the legislative branch legislates. But Lopez advocates judicial activism
when reviewing legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause-the
decision encourages courts to zealously review the legislation, to strike that
legislation that does not match a court's perceptions of "interstate commerce"
and "substantial" effects. The decision allows courts to demand Congress to
explain itself when legislating, and if a court dislikes that explanation, the
court may strike the law. Lopez allows these courts to replace Congress's
policy decisions with the court's policy. The court no longer reviews laws for
"rationality," but for "wisdom." The courts no longer maintain their adjudica-
tive role, but take on the function charged Congress by the Constitution.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 164-93; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding SMCRA); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)
(applying the Civil Rights Act to amusement parks); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (applying the Civil Rights Act to hotels and inns because of the effect of
racial discrimination on commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding
application of the Civil Rights Act to restaurants); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the NLRA because of the effect of labor strife on commerce). These
cases represent only a few of the countless federal commerce regulations.
368. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
369. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Coal & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
370. See e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
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C. The Flaws with the "Substantial Affects" Test
Even if the decision does not impose a heightened standard of review, the
Court applied a test which suffers from several flaws. Neither the Framers'
intent, the Constitution's language, nor Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden37" ' support the use of the "substantial affects" test. The test
is too broad, and grants Congress more power than those creating the power
ever envisioned.
First, the Framers never envisioned a power as broad as that under the
"substantial affects" test. They only meant to give Congress the power over
interstate activities, not all activities. This original purpose establishes the
reach of the Commerce Clause; the Commerce Clause must be viewed in light
of its purpose. This means that when courts review an action taken under the
Commerce Clause, they should ensure that the action does not exceed this
limited purpose envisioned by the Framers.
The states ceded to the federal government the power "to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.""' 2 The Framers created this unified power to protect the nation from
foreign powers,3" to direct the states' general interests into a common in-
terest of national strength,374 and to protect the nation from states' conten-
tions.375 The Constitution gives Congress the power to ensure that commerce
moves freely and remains unobstructed across the nation. Congress may also
govern commerce in the best interests of the nation overseas. If a law is nec-
essary to ensure that commerce moves freely, equitably, and productively, then
the law is a valid regulation of commerce.
Although the Framers' vision of "commerce" differed from "commerce"
today, they designed the Commerce Clause in broad enough terms which
allowed for these changes. Commerce, despite technological advances and
other changes, still encompasses those activities described by Chief Justice
Marshall in Gibbons.376 The activities affecting commerce in 1824 still affect
commerce today. The Framers understood commerce to encompass exchanges
of goods, trade, merchanting, and movement. Production was an entirely sepa-
rate enterprise.377 The Framers knew that the activities of commerce and
manufacturing had shared interests and that the vitality of one depended on the
371. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
372. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 3, cl. 8.
373. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
374. Id. at 69.
375. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 39-41 (Alexander Hamilton); see supra text accompanying
notes 27-33. The Framers feared that states would pursue selfish interests, enact discriminatory
laws, and grant preferences and exclusions. The unfair treatment would lead to wars among the
states, but if unified, the states would be protected from each other for each other. See supra text
accompanying notes 27-33.
376. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
377. The Federalist Papers often treated commerce as a distinct unit, separate from agricul-
ture, industry, or the arts. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1643 (1995) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); see e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 223 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring to manufactur-
ers as distinct from merchants); THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 133 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring
to commerce as a different unit than the arts and industry).
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vitality of the other. They understood that items produced became items
shipped.378 As Thomas's concurrence37 9 illustrated, early Americans knew
that commerce linked the states' agriculture and production."8 They were all
well aware that agriculture, production, and other local activities substantially
affected interstate commerce.
Despite this awareness, the Framers did not intend Congress to have pow-
er to regulate all local activities substantially affecting interstate com-
merce. 8' They expressly gave Congress the power to regulate only interstate
commerce-those activities that would unify and protect the nation and direct
the states' separate interests into a common goal. The Framers used the words
that best expressed their meaning.382 Had the Framers intended Congress to
have regulatory power over activities that "substantially affected" interstate
commerce, they would have either said, "Congress has the power over activi-
ties substantially affecting interstate commerce," or the Framers would have
enumerated those activities that they felt substantially affected interstate com-
merce, like agriculture, production, and mining. The modem "substantial af-
fects" test grew out of subtle, but nonetheless expansive, readings of the
Framers' ideas of commerce.383
In addition to the lack of support for the "substantial affects" test in light
of the intent of the Framers, the language of the Constitution and its enumera-
tion of powers also fails to support the test. The Constitution grants Congress
power to regulate interstate commerce, not power to regulate actions that
"substantially affect interstate commerce." A close reading of the Constitution
reveals that the "substantial affects" test makes the remaining legislative pow-
ers superfluous. Justice Thomas's concurrence also illustrated this point."'
He analyzed the "substantial affects" test in light of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.8 This Clause allows Congress to enact laws that are necessary, that
is, appropriate, to execute its enumerated functions, 86 and allows Congress
to pursue appropriate means to execute legitimate ends.387 Under Thomas's
378. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645 (Thomas, J., concurring).
379. See supra text accompanying notes 273-92 for a discussion of Thomas's concurrence.
380. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas cited several sources
revealing the early American's awareness of this link: Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder No. 1,
CONNECTICUT COURANT, Nov. 5, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 399 (M. Jensen ed., 1978) (telling farmers and producers that their prosperity
depended on the free flow of commerce); A Jerseyman: To the Citizens of New Jersey, TRENTON
MERCURY, Nov. 6, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra, at 147 (pointing to the connection between agriculture and commerce); William
Davie, 4 DEBATES 20 (a North Carolina Convention Delegate noting that commerce cannot flour-
ish without agriculture and agriculture cannot flourish without commerce).
381. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 105-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961) (rein-
forcing that agricultural and local activities belong to the states).
382. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Gibbons, "men use the words that best express their
meaning." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824).
383. See supra notes 124-93 (explaining the emergence and growth of the new "substantial
affects" test).
384. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
385. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For an analysis of Justice Thomas's concurrence, see
supra text accompanying notes 273-92.
386. See supra note 277 for text of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
387. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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analysis, the Court's reading of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause renders redundant the rest of the enumerated powers.388 For
example, there would be no need for Congress's enumerated power to coin
money since money is necessary to execute its Commerce Clause power.389
Money "substantially affects" commerce, and coining money is an appropriate
means to execute the power over an activity substantially affecting com-
merce.39 Likewise, the power to raise an Army39' would also fall within
Congress's commerce power; it is "necessary and proper" to execute the legiti-
mate power over activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. The
Framers, under this analysis, never needed to enumerate the additional power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations and Indian Tribes.39 Certainly
these two types of commerce substantially affect commerce among the states.
The Lopez Court's analysis of the Commerce Clause, then, negates the need
for other enumerated powers. An analysis abolishing the utility of the rest of
the Constitution cannot be consistent with the intent behind the document.
Nor does the watershed case of Gibbons v. Ogden393 support the "sub-
stantial affects" test. In Gibbons, Justice Marshall established the scope of the
Commerce Clause in an analysis consistent with the Framers' intent. Com-
merce, he wrote, is "a unit" incorporating all types of commercial intercourse
among the states.394 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to
prescribe rules governing and protecting the flow of commerce and all its
parts.395 The Constitution limits the reach of the power by its terms; Con-
gress may only regulate interstate commerce.396 It may only reach activities
that affect the several states.397 The Commerce Clause allows the federal
government to protect the states from each other and from foreign powers. It
prevents obstructions to the free flow of commerce but does not permit regula-
tions that are unnecessary to accomplish these purposes. The holding of Gib-
bons, that "commerce" included navigation, was neither surprising nor expan-
sive. Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation mirrored the Framers' vision.
Gibbons interpreted the Clause narrowly, never describing the Commerce
Clause to encompass a power over all activities that "substantially affect" in-
terstate commerce. Furthermore, Chief Justice Marshall clearly delineated
several activities Congress could not regulate even though they arguably had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.398
388. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
389. This assumes that the "substantial affects" test accurately characterizes Congress's com-
merce power.
390. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1644 (Thomas, J., concurring).
391. Congress has the power to raise and support and Army. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 12.
392. The power for these categories of commerce fall within the Commerce Clause.
393. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see supra text accompanying notes 35-61.
394. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
395. Id. at 190.
396. Id. at 194.
397. Id. at 195.
398. Id. at 203 (noting that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress control over numer-
ous state inspection laws or health and quarantine laws regardless of the effect of these activities
(low grade food, for example) on interstate commerce); see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. 1642, 1647 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating this same point by reinterpreting Justice
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Throughout the "substantial affects" test era, the Supreme Court probably
relied on a statement that Chief Justice Marshall made in Gibbons to explain
or justify its use of the "substantial affects" test. 99 Chief Justice Marshall
stated that federal power does not extend to activities that "do not affect other
states."'9 The Supreme Court later interpreted this statement to mean that
federal power must extend to activities that affect more than one state.40
However, this interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall's words is not neces-
sarily consistent with the Chief Justice's intent in Gibbons. Instead of inferring
the inverse, the Court could have interpreted Chief Justice Marshall to mean
that although the line between interstate and intrastate activities would be
difficult to draw, the federal, interstate power does not extend to the internal
activities of the state.4 2 In other words, the words of Chief Justice Marshall
place a limit on, or mark the ceiling of, congressional commerce power rather
than draw the floor, or the minimum, of the Commerce Clause. It does not
follow that since congressional power fails to reach activities not affecting
other states, then Congress may regulate all activities substantially affecting
other states. Because the "substantial affects" test stretches the language of
Gibbons and very likely Chief Justice Marshall's intent behind those words in
Gibbons, Gibbons does not support the "substantial affects" test.
D. The "Substantial Affects" Test Sees No Limits
The "substantial affects" test suffers from one major insufficiency: it is
too broad. The reason it is unsupported by the Framers' original intent, the
language of the Constitution, and the watershed opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden
is because the "substantial affects" test ultimately allows congressional regula-
tion of virtually all human endeavors. The test surpasses the purpose of the
Commerce Clause, to ensure national prosperity by unifying the nation into
one commercial nation. It exceeds the language of the Commerce Clause,
especially when read in light of the rest of the Constitution's enumerated
powers. And it extends the language of Gibbons by inferring a conclusion
Chief Justice Marshall never stated. The "substantial affects" test grants Con-
gress a very expansive power; nearly all activity in our interdependent, com-
mercial society has some ultimate tie to commerce. Moreover, the Supreme
Court never employed a limit that effectively bridled the power this test al-
lows. Although the Supreme Court tried to impose boundaries, these limits
added no bite to court review of congressional actions under the Commerce
Clause.
Early cases alluded to limits on Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce." 3 Some restricted Congress through the concept of dual
Marshall's analysis in Gibbons).
399. E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
400. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
401. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (reading Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation in Gibbons to
mean that Congress can regulate intrastate activities that so affect interstate activities).
402. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1647 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
403. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1888) (acknowledging that the cases all discuss the
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federalism."'4 Dual federalism posits that the federal government and state
governments are each sovereign governments in many areas; the two act to-
gether rather than allow federal preemption of a state action. Instead of pre-
emption, the federal government respects the states' authority over particular
areas, treading carefully in areas over which the states have authority. These
cases applying the concept of dual federalism warned the courts and Congress
against paralyzing the ability of the states to act. 5 Yet these cases also ac-
cepted that, in application, federal power preempted state law or at least oper-
ated in conjunction with state laws." Dual federalism, then, rarely deprives
Congress of power."
The Supreme Court attempted to impose other limits, besides dual federal-
ism, on Congress. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, the Court boldly asserted that rational basis review served as a limit
on congressional power.' But as the Supreme Court admitted in the oral
arguments of the Lopez case, if rational basis is the limit, then there is no limit
on congressional power.4 One can always find a rational basis. Other cases
alluded to the word "substantial" itself as a limit on Congress's use of the
Commerce Clause.4 Yet the facts of these cases reveal that the word "sub-
stantial" rarely limits legislative reach. If the word "substantial" encompasses
even trivial, noncommercial, intrastate activities, "2 it is hard to imagine an
activity that does not have a "substantial affect" on interstate commerce. 4'
Many acts affect commerce only trivially when considered in isolation. When
multiplied or aggregated, this trivial impact becomes substantial. For example,
one person boycotting a particular product almost imperceptibly impacts the
scope of the Commerce Clause, but none attempt to define the absolute extent of the power).
404. Baker, supra note 270, at 858. Dual Federalism posits that the two separate governments,
the federal level and the state level, are mutually exclusive systems, each respecting the others'
ability to govern certain areas and neither intruding upon the others' sovereignty. Id.
405. See Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. 568, 574 (1852); Kidd, 128 U.S. at 21; see generally Unit-
ed States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (stating that the states did not surrender their
power to protect the lives, health, and property of its citizens even if the regulated activity is
carried out by a private party with public interest).
406. Kidd, 128 U.S. at 18; see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968), overruled
by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 328 (1985) (asserting that there is no promise in the Constitution
that the federal and state governments will act free of each other); see Shreveport Rates Case, 234
U.S. 342, 351-52 (1914) (stating that the effect of the regulation of commerce is neither dimin-
ished by nor qualified by the fact that a state police power regulation may govern the same activi-
ty).
407. Dual Federalism also reflects the incorporation of the Tenth Amendment. The Tenth
Amendment provides, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. See supra note 195 for a discussion of the effect of the Tenth Amendment on congres-
sional commerce regulations.
408. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
409. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264.
410. Oral Argument at 19, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260).
411. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
119-20 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
412. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28; see supra text accompanying notes 153-63.
413. The Lopez Court obviously thought gun possession in a school zone does not sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). This Com-
ment, however, focuses on the fallacy of the Court's reasoning in reaching that conclusion.
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movement of that product. That boycott places a minute burden on commerce.
Multiply that boycotter by one hundred, however, and the boycott's impact on
commerce becomes substantial.
A federal prohibition on all individual, commercial boycotts seems absurd,
and surely beyond the commerce power. Yet compare the boycott example to
Wickard v. Filburn,"4 where the federal government prohibited anyone from
growing wheat in excess of the federal specified amount. Congress hoped to
force people to buy wheat on the market-thus compensating for an
overproduction of wheat. But Filburn chose to eat his own wheat rather than
buy it on the market, just as the boycotter decided not to buy a particular
product any longer. The boycott affects commerce the same way Filburn's
homegrown wheat consumption affected commerce; if all potential buyers of
that product decided not to buy it any longer, those decisions would substan-
tially affect interstate commerce." 5 Under Wickard, the federal government
could regulate a person's ability to boycott a product. In the aggregate, they
both substantially affect interstate commerce. Thus, the word "substantial"
hardly limits congressional reach under the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court in Lopez finally set a limit on congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. The decision tells Congress that it may still
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, but that gun
possession is not one of those activities. However, Lopez acts as an insuffi-
cient limit on Congress for one simple reason: it only limits Congress in situa-
tions that parallel the facts of Lopez. Lopez added no new limits to the expan-
sive test, except that in one set of facts, gun possession in a school zone, the
regulated activity did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez did
not limit the Commerce Clause or congressional power under that Clause; it
only limited Congress's ability to regulate gun possession in a school zone.
Congress must now, when legislating, distinguish between the permissible
regulations of the prior cases and the impermissible regulations of gun posses-
sion in a school zone. The only real limit, then, is on Congress's ability to
predict the validity of a regulation.
E. An Additional Flaw in the Court's Analysis: Gun Possession
Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce
Several arguments reveal that gun possession in a school zone does in fact
substantially affect interstate commerce. For example, Justice Stevens used an
article-of-commerce4 6 analysis in his dissent.4 7 Guns are articles of com-
414. 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see supra text accompanying notes 153-63. Briefly stated, the
Court upheld a federal prohibition of Filbum's home consumption of his own wheat instead of
buying it on the market. Filburn grew a surplus amount for his home use. The federal government
used the Commerce Clause to prohibit all growing of wheat for home use.
415. This is not an argument about the ability of the boycotter to speak about his boycott or
persuade others to boycott with him. It is about the effect of the boycott on the market. For the
purposes of argument, this Comment assumes there would be no speech limitations on the
government's ability to prevent the boycott.
416. Justice Stevens did not call his argument an "article-of-commerce" analysis.
417. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1651 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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merce,15 and people use guns to restrain commerce." 9 Possession, in or
out of a school zone, necessarily takes place after the gun's possession in
commerce. According to Stevens, possessing guns in school zones affects
commerce. The guns moved in commerce to reach the person carrying the gun
in the school zone, and the gun in the school zone might be used to restrain
commerce. 4"0 Justice Stevens also argued that Congress's ability to govern
commerce includes the power to oversee certain areas of the commercial mar-
ket.42' School-age children constitute one of these regulable markets. 2
Children buy guns.423
The articles-of-commerce argument is consistent with the Civil Rights
Cases.424 The Civil Rights Act applied to discrimination in private restau-
rants and amusement parks in part because both of these markets used items
moving in commerce.425 Just as Congress may regulate discrimination be-
cause of the effect of discrimination on the movement of goods in commerce,
so too may it regulate gun possession because of the effect of gun possession
on the movement of goods moving in interstate commerce.426
Justice Stevens also argued that Congress may regulate "the market" of
school age children.427 This argument compares to the arguments validated in
several cases. The Civil Rights Cases substantiate this principle. In Katzenbach
418. This assumes that at one time, the guns were bought, sold, or exchanged on the market.
Courts often consider items bought or sold as an article of commerce. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1643 (Thomas, J., concurring). Webster's defines commerce as, "the exchange or buying and
selling of commodities esp. [sic] on a large scale and involving transportation from place to
place-compare trade, traffic." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 456 (1986).
419. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 312-26 for the Lopez dissent's analysis of how gun
possession affects commerce.
421. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
422. Id. However, Congress did not limit the Gun-Free School Zone Act to the "sale" of guns
to children in a school zone. This "regulable market" argument requires only that the Act reach
those activities involving the sale of guns to individuals in that market.
On the other hand, legislation can be overinclusive. See Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1990). Presault held that under "rational basis" review, the Court is not at liberty to hold a law
invalid merely because more Draconian measures might advance the purpose more completely. Id.
"[Liegislating involves tradeoffs, compromises, and imperfect solutions, and [the Court's ability to
imagine designing] the state to advance one of Congress's ends does not render it irrational." Id.
(citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981)).
423. Alfonso Lopez brought the gun to school to sell to another student. Farmer, supra note
215, at 1674. This is only one example of a child buying a gun. More and more children carry
guns. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Like "Nike" shoes or video games, chil-
dren will buy the items that interest them. The possession of guns by children is the consequence
of commercial activity. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
424. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
425. Daniel, 395 U.S. 298 (regulating racial discrimination in amusement parks); Katzenbach,
379 U.S. 294 (applying the Civil Rights Act to private restaurants since restaurants use items
moving in interstate commerce).
426. This argument relies on the assumption that possession of an item requires that the item
at one time was bought or sold. This was not an unreasonably or illogical inference, assuming the
firearm was not built by the possessor. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1968), over-
ruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding the application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce).
427. See supra text accompanying notes 293-94, referring to this argument.
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v. McClung,"" for example, the Court upheld the application of the Civil
Rights Act in certain markets of discrimination."9 If Congress can regulate
certain markets, and if school age children form a market for guns, then Con-
gress can regulate gun possession in a school zone. The market is merely an
"instrument" of commerce,4 30 and Congress may regulate the instruments of
interstate commerce.43" ' It is at least reasonable that Congress sought to regu-
late this market, and the Court only requires that legislation enacted pursuant
to the Commerce Clause be reasonable.432
Justice Breyer, likewise contended that gun possession in school zones
substantially affects interstate commerce. He argued, however, that guns affect
commerce through their effect on education. Each day, more and more chil-
dren arrive at school carrying concealed weapons. 33 This creates an atmo-
sphere of fear, violence, and crime."4 Children cannot learn in such an envi-
ronment. 35 If a child is focusing on getting to and from school safely, the
child is not focusing on learning basic academic skills. This atmosphere causes
children to sleep poorly, eat poorly, and produce lower quality work.436
Guns, leading to violence and crime, significantly affect the drop-out rate. 3'
Due to the inherently dangerous nature of guns, Congress could reason-
ably conclude that crime, fear, and violence increase in areas where individu-
als carry and use concealed weapons. 38 Guns also discourage some well-
qualified teachers from teaching in those areas.4 39 Guns inhibit parents from
moving into areas where guns are present in the schools."' Guns place chil-
dren in perpetual fear of violence. Guns, therefore, threaten the educational
process. Since education intimately, tangibly, and substantially affects the
economy, impediments to education impede the vitality of commerce."'
Perhaps the effect of gun possession on commerce seems too far removed
to allow congressional regulation of gun possession. Some might say that gun
possession imposes only an indirect effect on commerce. But the Supreme
Court long ago rejected the direct/indirect standard for the "substantial affects"
428. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
429. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294 (upholding congressional regulation of racial discrimination
in restaurants).
430. See supra text accompanying notes 87-93.
431. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995).
432. Presault, 494 U.S. at 18-19.
433. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659.
434. Brief for the United States at 19-20, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No.
93-1260).
435. Justice Breyer asserted that children, quality education, and guns are "mutually exclu-
sive." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
436. Brief for the United States at 20-21, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No.
93-1260).
437. Id. at 20.
438. Id. at 18 (citing United States v. Trioli, 308 F. Supp. 358, 360 (D. Mass. 1970) (distin-
guishing between guns and drugs but stating that because of the dangerous nature of both, Con-




441. Id. at 22; see supra text accompanying notes 319-22.
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test." 2 Even activities with an indirect effect may substantially affect inter-
state commerce." 3
Gun possession affects commerce as much as activities the Supreme Court
previously upheld as regulable. The Jones & Laughlin and Darby Courts al-
lowed congressional regulation of labor strife because of the adverse impact of
labor strife on national productivity.4" Activities that injure national produc-
tivity substantially affect interstate commerce because of the intimate tie be-
tween national productivity and commerce. Under this reasoning, gun
possession's effect on national productivity renders it an activity within con-
gressional reach.
The "substantial affects" test allowed Congress to regulate racial discrimi-
nation in a restaurant because discrimination deterred travel, which diminished
the amount of supplies bought."5 Gun possession in a school zone requires
no more inferences than racial discrimination. Racial discrimination, like pos-
session of a gun, is not an article of commerce, and both occur at a local
level. Other precedents further reveal the inconsistent nature of the Lopez deci-
sion. Labor strife in hospitals and schools, mining reclamation and mining
waste, are all subject to regulation under Congress's commerce power. How-
ever, labor strife in hospitals and schools-noncommercial arenas-require
several inferences to see the effect on interstate commerce. Mining reclama-
tion certainly occurs locally, and mining waste is not an article of commerce.
When compared to the regulations previously upheld, and not overruled by
Lopez, it is clear that the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 governs an activ-
ity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
F. What the Court Could Have Done
Even though, arguably, gun possession in a school zone substantially
affects interstate commerce, allowing federal regulation of gun possession in a
school zone seems troubling. The Act resembles a police regulation, not a
commercial regulation. It seems Congress regulated gun possession because
guns pose physical, psychological, and moral dangers, rather than a "substan-
tial" danger to interstate commerce through its effect on the economy. If the
Court sought to limit congressional power, however, it could have done so
more effectively and clearly through an alteration of the "substantial affects"
442. See supra text accompanying note 123. It is interesting that the Lopez Court rejected the
Gun-Free School Zone Act because it required to pile "inference on inference." Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
at 1624. Yet the Court long ago rejected the direct/indirect effects test, replacing it with the "sub-
stantial affects" test, seemingly to allow Congress to regulate those activities that pose catastroph-
ic, albeit indirect, effects on commerce. This would mean that the Court hoped Congress could
regulate activities that required the courts to make inferences to see this "catastrophic" effect.
443. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
444. Darby upheld the FLSA because substandard labor conditions lead to labor strife and
labor strife interferes with the orderly, free market and national productivity. Darby, 312 U.S. at
110. The Jones & Laughlin Court upheld the NLRA because labor strife could cripple the entire
movement of commerce, negatively impacting national productivity. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S.
at 47.
445. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 299.
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test. The arbitrary holding of Lopez restricts the case's precedential value to its
facts.
The "substantial affects" test measures how much an act affects interstate
commerce, not the degree of the relationship. If it were possible to scale the
nexus, the "substantial affects" test asks: if the activity occurs one hundred
times, how many times will interstate commerce feel the effect? If it is
enough, the effect is substantial and the activity is regulable. Imagine a com-
pany having a monopoly over the car trade in this nation. If this monopoly
sold one hundred cars, pricing each at an outrageous cost to the consumer, one
hundred of those one hundred times the company sold the car, or one hundred
percent of the time, the consumers would pay too much or be deterred from
buying the car. Since commerce feels the effect one hundred percent of the
time, it is fair to say that the car monopoly imposes a "substantial affect" on
interstate commerce. The "substantial affects" test attempts to measure the
effects like the car-monopoly, those that impose an effect on commerce a
substantial amount of the time.'
The "substantial affects" test seems to measure the effects Justice Cardozo
spoke of in United States v. Schechter Poultry: 7
There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local in the activities of com-
merce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated perceptibly, though
minutely, to recording instruments at the center. A society such as
ours "is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors throughout its
territory; the only question is of their size.'"
The Lopez Court seemingly wanted to halt federal regulation of the motions at
the outer rim that only imperceptibly affected the inner recording instrument;
gun possession in a school zone is an outer rim motion, too small to create "a
tremor throughout its territory." However, the Court should have halted con-
gressional regulation of outer-rim motions by altering or qualifying the sub-
stantial affects test, by adding a limiting or qualifying prong to the test.
First, the Court could consider whether the regulated activity "substantial-
ly affects" interstate commerce in isolation or in the aggregate. This prong
would be the same method as the "substantial affects" test used in Lopez,
Darby, Wickard, Jones & Laughlin, and the other modem era cases. If the
Court determined that the activity substantially affects interstate commerce,
then the Court would consider whether federal regulation of the activity is
"appropriate." This additional prong is a small alteration to the current test,
allowing the Court to ensure that the regulated activity falls within the intent
and purpose of the Commerce Clause.
This additional prong asks whether the activity is one that the states al-
ready regulate effectively or adequately," 9 and whether the federal regulation
446. This is not to imply that the effect must be felt one hundred percent of the time to be
"substantial." Rather, this was only an example of an effect that would be clearly substantial.
447. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
448. Id. at 554 (quoting United States v. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 624 (2d Cir.
1935) (L. Hand, J., concurring) (Cardozo, J., concurring)).
449. It would be, no doubt, difficult for the courts to determine if the states "effectively or
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removes an actual obstruction to commerce or if it is a police power "in dis-
guise." A court would determine if the regulation's relation to commerce is
too tenuous to be proper. If the regulated activity is an "outer-rim ripple,""45
only "negligibly reflected through tremors at the center, ' '451 the act is too
attenuated to be a proper congressional regulation. Using this analysis, courts
would determine if there are intervening acts that supersede the activity's
effect on commerce. If the analysis requires too many inferences, assumptions,
and speculations to identify the nexus to interstate commerce, the regulation is
inappropriate.
This additional analytical prong-the "appropriateness" prong-would
limit the "substantial affects" test and clarify the distinction between the facts
of the Civil Rights Cases, Wickard, Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and the facts of
Lopez and the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990. Without this additional
prong, courts are left to speculate the distinction between the valid regulations
and the Gun-Free School Zone Act. This revised "substantial affects" test
would acknowledge that gun possession's effect on commerce is as substantial
as that of racial discrimination and labor strife within hospitals and schools.
Under this standard, however, upholding the Gun-Free School Zone Act would
be inappropriate because unlike labor strife in a hospital or school, upholding
the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 requires too many inferences, and
treads too heavily on state concerns. It was, in effect, an "outer-rim ripple"
only negligibly communicated to "recording instruments at the center." Acts
with tenuous relations to interstate commerce, like some environmental laws
and the Civil Rights Act, could withstand this additional prong, but not all
legislation would pass the test. For example, the Civil Rights Act could be
challenged as having too nebulous a connection to interstate commerce to be
valid. Upon review, the Court would first determine if racial discrimination
has a substantial affect on interstate commerce. The Court would conclude that
racial discrimination substantially affects interstate commerce through its dele-
terious effect on interstate travel and the movement of goods across state
lines.452 The Court would then consider whether federal regulation of racial
adequately" regulate an area of commerce. Perhaps this also calls for too much judicial activism.
However, using gun possession in a school zone as an example, the Court could have considered
whether the states were in the better position to be the governing body over that activity. In other
words, perhaps under this prong the Court would balance which government, state or federal,
would better regulate. In the case of gun possession in a school zone, the Court might have decid-
ed that the states are in the better position considering the diversity of the problem and the diver-
sity of school zones.
Several states already regulated gun possession or imposed some type of gun control before
or while the Gun-Free School Zone Act was in place. This calls into question the necessity of the
federal act. For example, Texas authorities charged Lopez under Texas law before federal authori-
ties stepped in. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Other state laws prohibiting gun possession in a school
zone, for example: ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.61.195(a)(2)(A), 11.61.220(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1994);
CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 626.9 (West Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 269, § 10(j) (1992);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(e) (West Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (1988); Wis.
STAT. § 948.605 (1991-1992).
450. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 554.
451. Id.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 164-75 for a discussion of the later civil rights cases,
upholding the Act as a valid exercise of congressional commerce power.
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discrimination is "appropriate." The Court would ask whether the states ade-
quately regulate racial discrimination. Arguably, the answer to this would be
no. While the states do enact legislation prohibiting discrimination, some states
leave certain types of discrimination out of their statutes. This would provide
inconsistent statutes, as well as inadequate laws.4" The Court would then ask
whether the Civil Rights Act actually removes an obstruction to commerce;
and the answer to this is, arguably, yes. If the Court determined that racial
discrimination imposes a deleterious effect on interstate commerce, then the
best means to remove that obstruction would be to prohibit the activity causing
the burden. The regulated activity, in this case, racial discrimination, would
not have to pass every category mentioned under this last prong. The prong
would simply be an added balance, so the Court would weigh the validity of
the legislation. Thus, the Civil Rights Act withstands rational basis scrutiny
under this revised "substantial affects" test. However, not all legislation would
pass this new test. For example, the Gun-Free School Zone Act might fail the
test; unlike racial discrimination, the states might regulate gun possession in a
school zone better than the federal government. The Court need not abandon
the "substantial affects" test, only limit it to its own terms and not by the facts
of a single case. This would provide guidance to lower courts and afford the
traditional, appropriate deference to Congress.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court undoubtedly granted certiorari on Lopez with the
intention of halting Congress's previously unfettered power under the Com-
merce Clause.4"4 A limit was necessary. Neither the Framers' intent, the
Constitution, nor early Commerce Clause interpretations supported an unlimit-
ed power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Yet the Lopez Court im-
posed a limit based solely on the facts of the one case, and thus, the limit
applies in factually limited circumstances. The Court should have altered the
"substantial affects" test to reflect the Framers' intent behind granting Con-
gress the power to regulate interstate commerce, for as it stands, the power
sweeps beyond this intent. The power also reaches beyond the language of the
Constitution and the watershed interpretation of the power in Gibbons v.
Ogden.55 By its terms, and according to valid precedent, the test is nearly
boundless. In practice, the Lopez decision did not "substantially affect" the
future of congressional power to regulate under the guise of the Commerce
Clause; the case only affects the method by which Congress regulates and the
method by which courts review those regulations.
The Lopez decision also raises some more serious implications. The Court
raised the standard of review, allowing-if not forcing-the courts to scale
deference to Congress according to the courts' perceptions of how much an
act affects interstate commerce. The Lopez decision forces courts to weigh
453. At least inadequate in comparison to the federal Civil Rights Act.
454. Or perhaps the Court granted certiorari on the case simply because they did not want
Congress to regulate gun possession in a school zone.
455. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
empirical findings and make legislative judgments. The courts must second-
guess the empirical decisions already made by Congress, and best left to Con-
gress. It tells the courts to examine not only the plausible rationality of legisla-
tion but the substance and merit of congressional findings. It empowers courts
with the authority and ability to not only adjudicate but to legislate. Lopez
may have disarmed congressional commerce power and armed the courts with
the very power it stole from Congress.456
Molly E. Homan
456. The Bureau of National Affairs compiled an interesting article on the Commerce Clause
since Lopez, stating that a new, good defense for many criminal charges will be "Congress ex-
ceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause." For a discussion of this defense, and a helpful
chart in indicating the statutes that Lopez threatens, see Exciting New Defense Hinges on (Yes) the
Commerce Clause, 9 Criminal Practice Manual (BNA) No. 18, at 417 (Aug. 30, 1995).
Finally, the Michigan Law Review dedicated a symposium issue to United States v. Lopez.
The symposium notes effects not discussed in this Comment. See Symposium, Reflections on
United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554 (1995).
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In war as in love, to bring matters to a close, you must get close together.
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